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Introduction
Financial markets in different areas of the world have many similarities, but
also some idiosyncratic features making them special. The similarities come
from the fact that most of the basic financial needs of household and en-
trepreneurs are, in a broad sense, analogous across countries and regions.
Credit, saving and insurance are demanded everywhere to smooth consump-
tion, make investments and face risks. But substantial differences arise in the
way these needs are met by the local financial institutions. Culture, geogra-
phy, politics and economics can, in fact, influence the interaction between the
institutions and their clients in a relevant manner.
In the first part of the thesis I focus on credit markets in developing coun-
tries, and describe the competitive interaction between Microfinance Insti-
tutions (MFIs). Microfinance has recently attracted a lot of attention from
investors, politicians, scholars and, most of all, people working on develop-
ment. As a results, a huge number of MFIs are being created all over the
world so that, as of today, practitioners reckon that about 100 millions of
customers are being served. Remarkably, about 67% of them are women.
The reason of this extraordinary effort is that Microfinance is considered
the most promising development tool currently available. This belief is based
on two important features of Microfinance: (i) It promises to be financially
viable (and in some cases even profitable) since poor people have proven to
be reliable clients. As a result, Microfinance is potentially a zero-cost devel-
opment tool. (ii) It hinges on the entrepreneurial abilities of the poor. It
is designed to help the poor to help themselves, in their own home coun-
tries, by allowing them to use their skills, ideas and potentials. This should
progressively make developing countries independent of rich ones’ help.
The growth of Microfinance has been so fast that many issues and related
research questions are still not answered. In my thesis I try to address one
of them, that I believe particularly important: the increase of competition
between MFIs. As economic theory predicts, competition can have dramatic
consequences in terms of borrower welfare, profitability of the institutions and,
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therefore, on the attractiveness of the business for potential investors, donors
and entrants. I use the tools of industrial organization and contract theory
to understand these effects, measure them, and give some interesting policy
advice.
In the first paper, I analyze the effects of entry of a new MFI in a previ-
ously monopolistic microcredit market. In order to catch the salient features
of financial markets in developing countries, I use a model of asymmetric in-
formation and assume that institutions can offer only one type of contract. I
consider different behavioral assumptions for the MFIs and study their influ-
ence on equilibrium predictions. The model allows showing that competition
can lead to equilibria in which MFIs differentiate their contracts in order to
screen borrowers. This process can, unfortunately, make the poor borrowers
worse off. Interestingly, the screening process we describe creates a previously
unexplored source of credit rationing. I also prove that the presence in the
market of an altruistic MFI, reduces rationing and, via this channel, affects
positively the competitor’s profit.
In the second paper, I study the effects of competition in those markets
in which, due to the absence of credit bureaus, small entrepreneurs can si-
multaneously borrow from more than one institution. As in the first paper, I
analyze an oligopolistic microcredit market characterized by asymmetric in-
formation and institutions that can offer only one type of contract. The main
contribution is to show that appropriate contract design can eliminate the
ex-ante incentives for multiple borrowing. Moreover, when the market is still
largely unserved and particularly risky, a screening strategy leading to con-
tract di?erentiation and credit rationing is unambiguously the most e?ective
to avoid multiple borrowing. The result of this paper can also be read as
important robustness checks of the findings of my first paper.
In the last part of the thesis, I depart from the analysis of developing
countries to consider, more generally, the corporate governance of financial
infrastructures. The efficient functioning of financial markets relies more and
more on the presence of infrastructures providing services like clearing, set-
tlement, messaging and many others. The last years have been characterized
by interesting dynamics in the ownership regime of these service providers.
Both mutualizations and de-mutualizations took place, together with entry
and exit of different players.
Starting from this observation, in the last paper (with Joachim Keller), we
analyze the effects of competitive interaction between differently owned nan-
cial providers. We mainly focus on the incentives to invest in safety enhancing
measures and we describe the different equilibrium market congurations. We
use a model in which agents need an input service for the nancial market they
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operate in. They can decide whether to provide it them selves by forming
a Cooperative or outsource it from a Third Party Provider. We prove that
the co-existence of differently governed infrastructures leads to a signicant re-
duction in the investment in safety. In most cases, monopolistic provision is
preferable to competition. Moreover, the decision rule used within the Coop-
erative plays a central role in determining the optimal market conguration.
All in all, throughout my thesis, I use the tools of industrial organization
and contract theory to model the competitive interaction of the different ac-
tors operating in financial markets. Understanding the dynamics typical of
developing countries can help in gaining a deeper comprehension of the mar-
kets in richer countries, and vice-versa. I am convinced that analyzing the
differences and the similarities of financial markets in different regions of the
world can be of great importance for economic theorists, in that it provides a
counterfactual for the assumptions and the results on which our predictions
and policy advices are based.
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Chapter 1
Competition and Altruism in
Microcredit Markets
Abstract: We analyze the effects of entry in a previously monopolistic mi-
crocredit market characterized by asymmetric information and by institutions
that offer only one type of contract. We consider different behavioral assump-
tions concerning the Incumbent and study their influence on equilibrium pre-
dictions. We show that competition leads to contract differentiation and that
this can make borrowers worse off. Moreover, the screening process creates a
previously unexplored source of rationing. We show that if the incumbent in-
stitution is altruistic, rationing is reduced and that its presence in the market
is strategically complement to the entrant’s profit.
Keywords: Microfinance, Competition, Altruism, Differentiation, Credit Ra-
tioning
JEL Classification: G21, L13, L31, O16
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1.1 Introduction
Microfinance is considered as one of the most promising instruments to reduce
poverty and promote economic development in many areas of the world. Its
potential is based on the idea that poor people have an unexplored amount
of entrepreneurial skills that ought to be taken into account in any sustain-
able development plan. Microcredit was designed to help the poor to help
themselves.
Microfinance is a diverse phenomenon. NGOs, banks, international orga-
nizations and various other forms of financial institutions are crowding into
the markets to supply the poor with affordable credit. Despite being active
in the same markets, these institutions are motivated by different objectives,
spanning from poverty reduction to profit maximization, passing through dif-
ferent definitions of financial sustainability. The effects of the competitive
interaction among these players on poverty reduction is unclear from both a
theoretical and empirical perspective. First, since Micro Finance Institutions
(MFIs) are often motivated by goals different than profit maximization, there
is no clear reason to believe that more competition necessarily lead to lower
prices. Indeed, empirical evidence shows that interest rates are not lower in
markets in which competition is very harsh.1 Second, financial sustainability
and lending technologies impose tight constraints on governance and man-
agement, so that asymmetric information cannot be addressed with standard
tools like, for instance, a menu of contracts. For these reasons, applying exist-
ing theories on competition (and, more specifically, on competition in credit
markets) to Microcredit is not straightforward.
In our paper we take explicitly into account some idiosyncrasies of mi-
crocredit markets. Our goal is to understand the effects of competition on
credit supply, borrower welfare and MFI profit. To capture the idea that
MFIs cannot offer the same variety of products that a standard bank would,
we assume that MFIs, although operating in a market with different types of
borrowers, can only offer one type of contract. We show how equilibrium pre-
dictions respond to different assumptions on MFIs objectives, and we prove
that altruistic behavior can be beneficial for both borrowers and competing
MFIs.
The good performances of some MFIs, together with the strong emotional
impact on public opinion, have attracted a large number of financial institu-
tions, banks, NGOs and donors to this emerging market. In countries like
Bangladesh, Uganda and Bolivia a process of sequential entry of institution
1See, for instance, Kaffu and Mutesasira (2003)
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has been observed. The market is usually pioneered by a small NGO, and it is
then followed by competitors that build on the experience of the predecessor.
The consequence of this process is that many institutions have now to deal
with the effects of competition. In countries like Bangladesh and Bolivia the
increase of credit supply is already affecting the incentives for repayment, the
fidelity of clients and the quality of the pool of borrowers. This is all the more
important that these are considered as key factors to explain the success of
microcredit.
Increased differentiation in terms of contract type has been one of the first
visible consequences of the increase in the number of competitors, although,
as many practitioners state, there is still a considerable overlap of geographic
areas and customers’ pools.
Standardizing to Compete: Lending money is not costless. Capital is
expensive, and so are enforcement of repayments, accountancy systems and
even storing of money. A large part of these costs is independent of the loan’s
size. For instance, the wage for a bookkeeper is the same no matter how small
the loan is. This makes microcredit relatively more expensive than standard
credit, leaving MFIs with a smaller profit margin. For this reason many of
them struggle for financial sustainability even though they use repayment in-
centives whose effectiveness has been widely tested. Reducing the managerial
cost is essential for the profitability of a microcredit program. To achieve this
goal, simplification of all the procedures is needed: microfinance contracts
need to be as standardized as possible.2 As a consequence, most of the MFIs
operating in competive markets offer extremely few contract types, and often
only one. 3
The most convincing explanation of this phenomenon comes from the fact
that lending money to the poor is possible only via the design and implementa-
tion of widely studied mechanisms such as group lending, dynamic incentives,
regular repayment schedules etc. These tools allow MFIs to tackle issues
2One of the highest costs for an MFI is labor. Microcredit is based on a strict personal
relation between MFIs’ employees and borrowers. They need to meet regularly, collect the
periodic repayments and control the quality of the investment. Hence, workforce is essential.
Nonetheless some MFIs prefer to hire less specialized personnel. This allows them to pay
lower wages, reducing the operational costs. But it also reduces the average quality of the
firm’s human capital. Standardization is the used to reconcile this trade-off.
3Some big and viable MFIs highlight this strategy as the main factor of their success. For
instance, ASA, in Bangladesh defines its organization as the Ford Motor Model of Microfi-
nance. The Grameen Bank, also operating in Bangladesh and probably the most celebrated
Microfinance Institution in the world, offers loans with a unique interest rate, and this is
certainly a special feature for a bank managing a portofolio of several millions of clients
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such as moral hazard, absence of collateral, adverse selection, gender speci-
ficity and so on. But the implementation of these mechanisms is complex,
often delicate. Moreover the choice of such mechanisms has important conse-
quences for the organization of the firms, both in terms of management and
infrastructure. Since the contracts offered by each MFI are an essential part
of these mechanisms, inevitably the choice of a particular interest rate has a
strong commitment power (at least in the short run) and makes it particularly
difficult to offer various contract types.
Our paper models a microcredit market with these characteristics. We
use a simple sequential game, with two firms (Incumbent and Entrant) and
two types of borrowers (Safe and Risky).4 We first assume that both firms
are profit maximizing. This framework fits a mature microcredit market (like
Bangladesh or Bolivia), dominated by few and large institutions, often with
an official Bank legal status. Then, we consider the case where the Incumbent
is altruistic. An altruistic institution maximizes the borrower welfare under
a non-bankruptcy constraint. We define two types of altruism that we label
as naive and smart. The difference is the way the Incumbent MFI takes into
account the reaction of the Entrant. This approach better describes a younger
microcredit market and is empirically very relevant. Indeed, in most countries,
microcredit has been pioneered by NGO programs with a clearly stated social
aim. Some of them have then transformed into profit maximizing institutions,
but others have kept their status unchanged and have started competing with
profit maximizing entrants.
We show that MFIs have incentives to differentiate their contracts. This
leads to equilibria in which competitors offer incentive compatible contracts
that allow for screening of the borrower types. In these equilibria, the Risky
borrowers enjoy an informational rent and the Safe ones are rationed. Yet,
rationing is not merely a consequence of adverse selection as in Stiglitz and
Weiss (1981). In our model, the level of rationing depends in fact on the
outside options of the competing institutions.
The presence of more than one MFI introduces some competitive pressure,
and this have a negative effect on expected profits. On the other hand it makes
screening possible even when MFIs can offer only one contract. Thus, MFIs
can offer more targeted contracts and extract more rent. As a consequence,
from the borrowers’ point of view, competition is not necessarily welfare en-
hancing: we show that under some conditions the borrower welfare is lower
under competition than under monopoly.
4The sequential structure of the game is very helpful to ease exposition but is not essential,
since all the results are valid also in a simultaneous setting. See Casini (2009).
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Our model also relates to one of the most controversial debates in the
microfinance literature, concerning the long run strategic behavior that MFIs
should adopt in order to increase the outreach of microfinance. One side of
this debate claims that microfinance should abandon the NGOs non-profit
behavior and turn into a profit seeking business, independent of any form
of subsidy. The argument is that profit maximizing behavior leads to more
rigorous financial management. This, in turn, attracts more investors and
enlarges the market capacity. More poor people can then be served in a
profitable way, leading to a clear welfare gain. On top of that, the demand for
credit is believed to be quite inelastic. This would allow to increase interest
rates with limited consequences on the outreach.
But other researchers and practitioners fear that such a behavior might
end up hurting the poor. In their view, microfinance is helpful only if it allows
poor borrowers to accumulate capital to be reinvested in their small business.
An MFI too focused on profit maximization could, in an oligopolistic market,
be able to extract most of the rent, reducing the beneficial effect of access
to credit. This phenomenon seems relevant since in some countries many
standard banks are currently scaling down part of their business to enter
the microfinance market. Moreover, there is experimental evidence that the
demand for credit is actually elastic (See Karlan and Zinman (2007)).
Our model shows that this threat is realistic. In particular we find that in
equilibrium a profit maximizing MFI is able to extract the entire surplus from
at least one borrower type. By contrast, if the Incumbent is altruistic, all
the borrowers have positive rent and credit rationing is lower in equilibrium.
More surprisingly this is possible while letting the profit maximizing Entrant
earn a strictly positive profit that is, under certain conditions, even higher
than the profit she would earn when the Incumbent maximizes her profit.
In other words, the presence of an altruistic firm in the market makes not
only all the borrowers better off, both in terms of rationing and rent, but can
also result into an incentive for profit maximizing firms to enter the market.
This is due to the fact that the Incumbent’s altruism reduces the amount of
rationing necessary to screen the borrowers, so that in equilibrium the Entrant
can benefit from serving a larger number of clients.
Other papers have examined the issue of increasing competition in mi-
crocredit Markets. McIntosh and Wydick (2005) present a model in which
MFIs maximize the number of borrowers served and cross-subsidize the non-
profitable borrowers using the profits earned by serving the profitable ones.
They show that as competition increases, the profits from profitable borrowers
shrink, so that more poor borrowers are excluded from credit. Their result is
based on the assumptions that poor borrowers are less profitable than richer
17
ones, and that MFIs can offer a different contract for each borrower. We
will assume, instead, that all borrowers give ex-ante the same expected profit
although they differ in their level of risk.
McIntosh, de Janvry and Sadoulet (2005) present an empirical analysis of
the highly competitive microcredit market in Uganda. Studying the location
decision of the MFIs, they find a strong tendency towards the creation of
clusters of institutions, even though the presence of a competitor in the market
increases the level of defaults. Our model provides a possible explanation for
this phenomenon.
Our paper is closely related to the work of Navajas, Conning and Gonzales-
Vega (2003). They describe the Bolivian microcredit market and its evolution
from monopoly to duopolistic competition. They stress that the two main
institutions in the market (Bancosol and Caja Los Andes) have specialized
in different market niches: they offer different contracts based on different
mechanisms that attract different types of borrowers. This pattern seems to
be common in microcredit markets. Our paper draws on this observation.
The paper is organized as follows: In Sections 1.2 we introduce the model.
In Section 1.3 we describe the Entrant’s reaction function. In Section 1.4 we
analyze the Incumbent’s behavior we show how and when differentiation takes
place, taking into account different behavioral assumptions for the Incumbent.
In section 1.5 we conclude.
1.2 The Model
Consider a microcredit market initially served by a single MFI (the Incum-
bent), and suppose that a second one (the Entrant) is considering entering
the market. There is a unit measure of borrowers demanding a loan to finance
a new business. The size of the loan is, for simplicity, set to one. There is
a fraction β of safe borrowers characterized by a return Rs and a probability
of success ps, and a fraction 1 − β of risky borrowers with return Rr and
probability of success pr. We assume that piRi = m > 1 and that ps > pr.
Hence Rs < Rr. This ensures that both types have the same expected return.
Thus MFIs are ex-ante indifferent between serving either type of borrowers.
We also set prRs ≥ 1, so that, even in case of mismatch between contract and
borrower type, lending is viable.
MFIs can only serve a fraction α ∈ [0, 1) of borrowers. We assume that
α > max{β, 1 − β} (implying that α ≥ 1/2) so that MFIs are able to serve
at least all the borrowers of a given type. They can offer only one contract,
defined as a pair C = (x,D), in which they specify the repayment D ∈ R+,
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inclusive of principal and interests, and the probability x ∈ [0, 1] for a borrower
to be served (or, in other words, the fraction of the demand the MFI is willing
to serve). We denote by CI = (xI ,DI), the contract offered by the Incumbent
and with CE = (xE ,DE), the contract offered by the Entrant. The borrowers’
type is private information. As a tie-breaking rule, we assume that even when
the contract leaves the borrowers with no rent, they still prefer borrowing to
not borrowing.
The timing is the following: at time t = 1 the Incumbent sets his contract.
The Entrant observes the market and the Incumbent’s strategy and at time
t = 2 she decides whether to enter the market or not. At time t = 3, the
borrowers observe both contracts and choose their favorite.
The choice of a particular contract determines the pool of borrowers served.
In this respect their choice results in a commitment: once a contract (and the
underlying mechanism) is chosen, it cannot be changed in the short run. As
argued in the Introduction, this assumption seems quite plausible. Part of the
successes of microfinance is due to the design of innovative mechanisms able
to deal with issues as moral hazard, absence of collateral, adverse selection,
gender specificity and so on. These mechanisms are tailor-made to address the
unique features of the socio-economic environment of the borrowers, and can
therefore be substantially different across MFIs.5 The differences in mecha-
nisms are reflected in the management and organization of the MFIs. A clear
evidence of that is that extremely few MFIs use more than one mechanism.
Hence, once a mechanism is designed and implemented, it is reasonable to
think that an MFI has to stick to it at least in the short run.
We do not model explicitly any of these mechanisms, but we think the
contracts as being a fundamental part of them. This approach is correct
as long as we can consider the repayment (or in other words the interest
rate) as the main strategic variable of the market. Despite the importance
of the underlying mechanisms, there is clear evidence that borrowers actually
consider the interest rate as a fundamental parameter to base their decision
on.6
We solve the model considering first the Entrant’s optimal reaction for any
given choice by the Incumbent, and then proceed by backward induction to
specify the optimal choice by the Incumbent.
Note that any contract acceptable by the Safe borrowers attracts also the
Risky ones since Rs < Rr. Thus, when only one MFI is in the market, she
5For instance, it is extremely common to observe in the same market MFIs adopting only
group lending and others using only individual lending.
6See, for instance, Karlan and Zinman (2007).
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can only decide on whether to serve the risky or both types. When two MFIs
are operating, instead, they can make any choice: should they choose to serve
only safe borrowers, the presence of the competitor can help them screen out
one type from the other.
Borrowers compare the contracts offered by both the Incumbent and the
Entrant and decide on the MFI at which they want to apply for credit. Bor-
rowers are solely concerned by the monetary outcome of the contract, so the
demand faced by each MFI depends on CI and CE. We define the demand
function as Bi(·, ·) : (R+ × [0, 1]) × (R+ × [0, 1]) → [0, 1]. It assigns to each
combination of contracts the mass of borrowers preferring MFI i. We can
partition the space of contracts into four cases:
1. Full separation: xips(Rs −Di) > xjps(Rs −Dj) and xjpr(Rr − Dj) ≥
xipr(Rr−Di), for i 6= j ∈ I,E: in this case the Safe borrowers prefer the
contract offered by firm i, whereas the Risky ones prefer the contract
offered by j. Thus, β borrowers apply for credit to MFI i (Bi(Ci, Cj) =
β), and 1 − β to MFI j (Bj(Ci, Cj) = 1 − β). If these conditions are
fulfilled the MFIs can screen the borrowers.
2. Full coverage by both: Di ≤ Rs; Dj ≤ Rs; xips(Rs−Di) > xjps(Rs−Dj)
and xipr(Rr−Di) > xjpr(Rr−Dj): in this case all the borrowers prefer
the contract offered by MFI i. Thus Bi(CI , CE) = 1 but, because of the
capacity constraint, MFI i can at most serve the first α applicants. The
remaining 1 − α (the residual demand of both types) is served by j, so
that Bj(CI , CE) is bounded below by 1− α.7
3. Partial separation: Di ≤ Rs; Rs ≤ Dj ≤ Rr; xips(Rs−Di) > xjps(Rs−
Dj) and xipr(Rr−Di) ≥ xjpr(Rr−Dj): also in this case Bi(Ci, Cj) = 1,
so that MFI i can serve up to α borrowers. But MFI j is only able to
attract the residual demand of the Risky borrowers, so that Bj(Ci, Cj)
is bounded below by (1− α)(1− β).
4. Exclusion: Rs ≤ Di ≤ Rr; Rs ≤ Dj ≤ Rr and xipr(Rr − Di) ≥
xjpr(Rr −Dj): in this case both MFIs can attract only the Risky bor-
rowers, who in turn prefer the contract offered by i. We have then
Bi(Ci, Cj) = 1− β and Bj(Ci, Cj) = 0.
7The actual residual demand depends on the mass of borrowers served by the competitor.
MFIs can in principle decide not to use their whole capacity (setting x < 1). But given the
capacity constraint, the residual demand measures at least 1− α.
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We assume that if both MFIs offer the same contract, they share the
demand equally. Moreover, both types are equally rationed.8
1.3 The Entrant Strategy
As mentioned above, at time t = 2 the Entrant chooses her contract upon
the observation of the Incumbent’s choice. She has then three different pos-
sibilities: (i) Offer a contract that attracts all the borrowers of a specific
type; (ii) Target the residual demand of the chosen sector(s); (iii) Offer a
non-specialized contract, suited to attract both types. As we will see, the
first option is only feasible if the Incumbent has set a contract that allows
screening. Let P (·, ·) : (R+ × [0, 1]) × (R+ × [0, 1]) → [0, 1] be the function
assigning to each combination of contracts the probability of repayment. It
takes value pr, ps or pb := βps+(1−β)pr when the MFI serves respectively the
Risky, the Safe or Both types of borrowers. The Entrant faces the following
maximization problem:
max
xE ,DE
ΠE = XE(CE, CI , α)
[
PE(CI , CE)DE − 1
]
where XE(CE , CI , α) := min{xEBE(CI , CE), α} denotes the mass of borrow-
ers served by the Entrant.
The Entrant’s strategy set is given by the set of all possible contracts
(x,D) such that x ∈ [0, 1] and D ≥ 1. But the strategy set can be divided
in three subsets, each of them identifying a possible intention: serving the
Risky, the Safe or Both borrower types. In other words, the choice of a
contract determines the group to target to, but also the strategic behavior to
adopt with respect to the competitor: a particular contract (xi,Di) determines
whether there will be direct competition (both MFIs targeting the same pool
of borrowers as in case 2 and 4 of the taxonomy), full separation (each MFI
specializing in a particular group as in case 2) or monopolistic behavior on the
residual demand (the MFI exploits the capacity constraint of the competitor
as in case 3).
Since by assumption 1 > α ≥ max{β, (1 − β)}, whatever the Incum-
bent strategy is, the Entrant can always target the residual demand (1 −
xIBI(CI , CE)), and impose on it a monopoly price. For the sequel, it is use-
ful to calculate the profit the Entrant earns serving the residual demand of
the Risky types, when the Incumbent faces a demand BI(CI , CE) = 1 (case
8This taxonomy is exhaustive since if the Safe borrowers are indifferent between the
contracts, then also the Risky are.
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3 in the taxonomy), i.e. serves both markets. The Entrant optimally sets
DE = Rr and x
E = 1, extracting the whole surplus from the residual Risky
borrowers and earning:
ΠResR = (1− α)(1 − β)(m− 1). (1.1)
In the same way we can define the profit the Entrant earns serving the residual
demand of both types. She sets DE = Rs, extracting all the Safe borrower’s
surplus and leaving the Risky ones a rent. She earns:
ΠResB = (1− α)[β(m− 1) + (1− β)(prRs − 1)] (1.2)
Finally, if the Entrant serves both types, facing a demand BE(CI , CE), her
profit is given by:
ΠBoth = α(β(m− 1) + (1− β)(prRs − 1)) (1.3)
Screening borrowers is only possible when competitors coordinate. If an
MFI chooses to specialize in the Risky sector, the screening is easily done by
setting a contract with D > Rs, so that no Safe borrower is willing to apply.
But serving only the Safe borrowers is not so easy. A suitable contract for the
Safe type, requires a lower value of D, and that surely attracts also the Risky
borrowers.
In our model, as in a more standard screening problem, MFIs can ration
some borrowers in order to make screening possible. By properly adjusting
the value of x, they can reduce the expected profitability of the contract
designed for the Safe borrowers. At the same time, the Risky ones can be
given an informational rent. This idea is quite standard, but we apply it
in a particular way: in our model the optimal contracts are the result of a
competitive interaction between two different MFIs, each offering one single
contract. In what follows, we prove the existence of equilibria in which the
MFIs find it profitable to design screening contracts in order to make this
differentiation possible.
Screening Strategies: Since the Entrant’s contract is chosen after the ob-
servation of the Incumbent’s choice, under some conditions the Incumbent
can induce the Entrant to serve one particular market niche and engage in
a screening strategy. She can do it by offering a contract that makes it op-
timal for the Entrant to target only one type of borrowers. We explain the
mechanism in the next two lemmas.
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Lemma 1. If the Incumbent chooses a contract such that DI ≤ Rs and xI <
min{xˆs(DI), 1} where xˆs(DI) is defined as:
α(m− 1)
m− prDI if ΠResR ≥ max{ΠResB ,ΠBoth}
(1− β)(m− 1)−ΠResB
(1− β)pr(Rr −DI) if ΠResB ≥ max{ΠResR,ΠBoth}
(1− β)(m− 1)−ΠBoth
(1− β)pr(Rr −DI) if ΠBoth ≥ max{ΠResR,ΠResB}
then the Entrant’s optimal reaction is to offer a contract (xE = 1;DE =
Rr − xIxE (Rr −DI)), so that screening takes place with the Incumbent serving
the Safe borrowers and the Entrant serving the Risky.
Proof. See Appendix 1.6
When the Incumbent is profit maximizing, the relevant outside option is
ΠEBoth. The other options matter when the Incumbent is altruistic.
The intuition behind this result is standard: if the Incumbent wants to
serve only the safe borrowers, she must exclude some of them. What is less
standard is that the number of excluded borrowers depends on the prevailing
Entrant’s outside option.
To understand why, remember that, as in any screening model, the level
of rationing is inversely proportional to the informational rent: the higher is
the informational rent given to the Risky borrowers, the lower is the level of
rationing needed to induce self-selection of the contracts. But the Entrant’s
profit (from serving only the Risky) is lowered by the informational rent that
her customers must be given. Thus, the higher is the number of excluded
Safe borrowers, the higher is the Entrant’s profit. In other words, to induce
screening, the Incumbent must exclude a high enough number of customers
(xˆs(D
I)) in order to make the Entrant’s profit higher than the outside options.
The Incumbent behaves the way explained above whenever serving the Safe
market niche is her most profitable strategy. Clearly, this is not necessarily the
case. The Incumbent can, in a similar way, decide to specialize in the Risky
market niche, inducing the Entrant to specialize in the Safe one and to make
screening possible. In order to do it, she has to grant the Risky borrowers
an adequate informational rent, allowing the Entrant to ration as few Safe
borrowers as possible. The mechanism is detailed in the next lemma. Define
DImin :=
ΠRes−xEβ
xEβps
. This is the minimum value of DI making the Entrant
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indifferent between the screening profit and the relevant outside option.9
Lemma 2. If the Incumbent offers a contract (xI ,DI) characterized by:
DImin < D
I ≤ DˆI(xI) := Rr − 1
xI
x˜E(Rr −DI) (1.4)
where
x˜E := max
{
α
(
1 +
(1− β)(prRs − 1)
β(m− 1)
)
,
(1− β)(m− 1)
β(m− 1) + (1− β)(m− prRs)
}
.
Then the Entrant’s optimal reaction is to offer a contract characterized by
xE < min{x˜E , 1} and DE = Rs, so that screening takes place with the Incum-
bent serving the Risky borrowers and the Entrant serving the Safe ones.
Proof. See Appendix 1.6.
Also in this case, to attain screening, Risky borrowers must be given better
conditions via a reduction of the repayment Dr. At the same time some of
the Safe borrowers must be rationed.
An important implication of the two lemmas above is that if specialization
is an equilibrium in a microfinance market, then it is an equilibrium with credit
rationing. This rationing is due to the combined effect of adverse selection and
oligopolistic competition. Different than in Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), where
rationing is merely a consequence of the presence of ‘bad’ types in the market,
in our model the value of xs is also determined by the best option the competi-
tor has with respect to the screening strategy. In Lemma 1, the Incumbent
chooses the level of rationing in order to make the screening strategy optimal
for the Entrant. In Lemma 2, the Incumbent increases the information rent
offered to the Risky borrowers in order to reduce rationing of the Safe ones
and increase the Entrant’s profit. This an explanation for rationing in mar-
kets with a limited availability of contract types and oligopolistic competition
that, to our knowledge, has not been explored before.
Non-screening Strategies: When the conditions stated in Lemmas 1 and
2 are not fulfilled screening is not possible. As illustrated in Figure 1.1, there
are two cases to consider.
9The threshold DImin is important since, as shown in the Appendix, as long as D
I > Rs
the Incumbent can raise the Entrant’s profit from screening by setting a lower DI . But
if DI < Rs the Entrant’s profit might decrease because a lower D
E (necessary to have
screening) is only in part compensated by a higher xE.
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Figure 1.1: Entrant strategies as a function of the Incumbent strategies
In the first case, the Incumbent sets a contract with DI ≤ Rs, but xI ≥ xˆIs
(region xˆIsAD1). By choosing such a contract the Incumbent indicates that her
preferred strategy is to serve both types. The Entrant can then either undercut
the Incumbent’s price, or she can simply decide to serve the residual demand.
More precisely, the Entrant knows that by serving the residual demand she
can earn:
ΠRes = max{ΠEResR; ΠEResB}. (1.5)
Alternatively she can earn:
ΠUndct = α[β(psD
I − 1) + (1− β)(prDI − 1)] (1.6)
(where xE = α). The choice clearly depends on the value DI set by the
Incumbent.
In the second case, the Incumbent sets a contract lying in the region
RsRrECB. This is a contract that only suits the Risky borrowers but does
not fulfill the condition of Lemma 2. The Entrant has two possible strategies:
(a) undercut the Incumbent’s price. (b) offer a contract with xE = α and
DE = Rs. In this last case she serves a fraction α of both borrowers’ type,
making a profit:
ΠEBoth = α{β(m − 1) + (1− β)(prRs − 1)} (1.7)
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and leaving the Incumbent with the residual demand on the risky borrowers.
1.4 The Incumbent Strategy
We have now all the elements to analyze the Incumbent’s optimal strategy. In
order to better describe the special features of microfinance markets, we will
consider three different behavioral assumptions: profit maximization, naive
altruism and smart altruism. This will help us to understand more features
of a highly heterogeneous phenomenon, and to provide some policy advice via
the comparison of the effects on welfare of different conducts.
1.4.1 The Profit maximizing Incumbent (PM Model)
We start by assuming that the Incumbent MFI is profit maximizing. Despite
the presence of many socially motivated institutions the biggest and more
influential MFIs do claim to be able to make significant profits, and consider
this ability as the result of a careful and business oriented management. This
has remarkable implications: if microfinance showed to be effective in poverty
reduction, then this result could be attainable in a costless or even profitable
way.
This win-to-win promise has generated mixed reactions. On the one hand
there has been a huge (and probably naive) wave of enthusiasm by a number
of NGOs that glimpse in microcredit the ultimate solution to their financial
problems. On the other hand a number of researchers and practitioners showed
quite some skepticism. Indeed the profitability of some MFIs seems to be
quite sensible to the definition itself of profit, since in some cases unorthodox
accountancy methods are used.
Anyway, the advocates of a pure profit maximizing behavior seem to be
the most numerous and the most influential, so that more and more MFIs are
trying to follow their advice. In order to get a better theoretical understanding
of the problems involved in this debate, we now examine a model describing
a scenario in which the Incumbent behaves as a profit maximizer.
Let CE(CI) be the Entrant’s reaction function to the Incumbent’s strategy.
The Incumbent faces this maximization problem:
max
xI ,DI
ΠI = XI(CI , CE(CI), α)
[
P (CI , CE(CI))DI − 1]
The Incumbent, just like the Entrant, can choose whether to specialize in
a particular sector or to target both types of borrowers. In the first case
she needs to induce the Entrant to offer an incentive compatible contract as
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showed in Lemma 1 and 2. In what follows we describe her optimal behavior
for each possible case.
Incumbent serves the Safe borrowers: If the Incumbent wants to at-
tract all the Safe borrowers she needs to offer a contract satisfying the condi-
tions in Lemma 1, inducing the Entrant to target the Risky borrowers and to
offer an incentive compatible contract. When the Incumbent is profit maxi-
mizing the Entrant’s dominant outside option is to undercut the Incumbent’s
contract setting xE = 1 and DE = DI . Thus the relevant value of xˆs(D
I) is
the last in Lemma 1. In fact, since xˆs(D
I) is increasing in DI , the Incumbent
will choose DI as big as possible, taking into account the constraint D ≤ Rs.
This leads to DI = Rs. As a consequence, serving the residual demand would
give a strictly smaller profit. If the constraint in Lemma 1 is not binding, then
the Incumbent just set xI < 1.
Under these conditions BI(CI , CE) = β, and the Incumbent’s expected
profit is:
ΠIsr = βxˆs(Rs)(m− 1). (1.8)
Incumbent serves the Risky borrowers: If the Incumbent wants to serve
all the Risky borrowers she can either induce the Entrant to serve the Safe
ones only (and engage in a screening strategy) or she can offer a non targeted
contract.
In the first case the findings of Lemma 2 apply. DˆI (see (1.4)) is increasing
in xI , so the Incumbent chooses xI = 1, and DI = DˆI(1). This gives her the
expected profit:
ΠIrs = (1− β)(prDˆI − 1) (1.9)
In the second case her profit is nil if the Entrant chooses the Risky sector,
too. Otherwise she earns ΠResR = (1− α)(1 − β)(m− 1)
Incumbent serves both types: The Incumbent knows that when she
chooses this strategy, the Entrant reacts targeting either the Risky or Both
borrowers. It follows that the unique Incumbent’s concern is the danger of
price competition by the Entrant. This reasoning implies the following simple
result:
Lemma 3. In any equilibrium with no screening in which the Incumbent
serves both types, her profit is given by:
ΠIb = ΠRes = max{ΠResR,ΠResB} (1.10)
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Proof. See Appendix 1.6.
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Figure 1.2: Incumbent Profit: Example 1.
In order to choose her optimal strategy, the Incumbent has then to compare
equations (1.8), (1.9) and (1.10). Not surprisingly, the ranking depends on
the values of the parameters. Let Θ be the set of parameters such that an
equilibrium with screening prevails. More formally
Θ = {α, β, pr , ps, Rr, Rs|ΠIsr ≥ max{ΠIrs,ΠIb} ∨ΠIrs ≥ max{ΠIsr,ΠIb}}.
We prove that Θ is always non-empty and that under some general conditions
has a strictly positive measure.
Proposition 1. The set Θ is always non-empty. Moreover it has a strictly
positive measure if one of the following conditions is satisfied:
α > m−prRs
m−1 or α <
prRs−1
m−1 or α >
m−1
2m−prRs−1
The first condition applies when the incumbent serves the Risky borrowers
and ΠResB ≥ ΠResR. The second one applies when the Incumbent serves the
Safe borrowers and ΠResB ≥ ΠResR. Finally, the last condition applies when
the Incumbent serves the Safe borrowers and ΠResR ≥ ΠResB.
The first two conditions are easier to satisfy when prRs is big or, in other
words when the level of heterogeneity of the borrowers is low. The third
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Figure 1.3: Incumbent Profit: Example 2.
condition, instead, is satisfied when prRs is small, so that heterogeneity is
large.
Given the observations above, the third condition is the easiest to inter-
pret (and to satisfy). Indeed, when heterogeneity is large, then the condition
ΠResR ≥ ΠResB is easily satisfied. Moreover, this is the situation in which
the opportunity cost from serving the wrong type is the highest. So there are
clear incentives to engage in a screening strategy.
The first two situations are somewhat less intuitive. When heterogeneity
is low, then the Entrant’s outside option is larger, so that it is more difficult
for the Incumbent to induce screening. On the other hand, also the Incumbent
outside option is larger (they are actually the same). But the Incumbent profit
also increases when prRs increases, so that screening is possible when prRs is
quite big.
The conditions above ensure that either ΠIsr or Π
I
rs intersects Π
I
B twice, as
showed in Figure 1.2 and 1.3. Since ΠIsr and Π
I
rs are concave, this is enough
to show that the set Θ has a strictly positive measure. The three functions
have a common intersection point in β = βc. The conditions in Proposition
1 make sure that the second intersection point lies in the right region, to the
left or to the right of βc depending on whether ΠResR is bigger or smaller
than ΠResB . Note that the three thresholds are well defined since they always
belong to [0, 1].
This result shows that in a microfinance market the special kind of prod-
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uct differentiation we described is not a singularity. This is in line with the
empirical findings of Navajas et Al. (2003).
Welfare Anaysis: We can now examine the results above in order to un-
derstand the consequences of competition for the profitability of MFIs and the
welfare of the borrowers. As a first conclusion, competition is always better
than monopoly in terms of total welfare.
Proposition 2. When two MFIs are operating in the market, the total welfare
is higher than it would be under a monopolistic regime.
Proof. See Appendix 1.6
It must be stressed that this result depends mostly on the fact that, since
α ≤ 1, the presence of two MFIs ensures a larger outreach. Still, we claim that
competition is not necessarily the best scenario for poor borrowers. Indeed, if
we consider borrower welfare as a good proxy for poverty reduction, than the
effects of increasing competition are ambiguous when one takes into account
the bias given by the capacity constraint. Indeed, it is easy to show that
competition can make borrowers worse off if compared to a monopoly with no
capacity constraint.
Proposition 3. If the parameters are such that a monopolist with no capacity
constraint would serve both types, then in equilibria with screening the Risky
borrowers enjoy less rent and the Safe ones are more rationed.
Proof. See Appendix 1.6
The result is due to the fact that, in a competitive equilibrium, the MFI
serving the Risky borrowers is able to extract a higher rent than a monopo-
list who does not want to exclude the Safe borrowers. Clearly the reverse is
true if a monopolist prefers serving the Risky borrowers only. In such a case
competition can only have positive effects. This observation has important
policy implications since, very often, the capacity constraint of MFIs is deter-
mined by socially motivated investors or donors (like The World Bank etc.).
If their goal is to maximize borrower welfare, then there are instances in which
financing only one monopolist can be better than financing two competitive
MFIs.
It is also worth noticing that the Entrant is always guaranteed the profit
ΠBoth. As a consequence, in all the cases in which a monopolist would target
both types, the Entrant earns the same profit she would earn if she were
without competition. That provides one more possible explanation for the
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puzzling behavior of MFIs described by McIntosh, de Janvry and Sadoulet
(2005), who report that MFIs prefer to locate where other MFI are already
active despite the possible negative effect of competition.
1.4.2 The Altruistic Incumbent (AI Model)
We now turn to consider a different behavioral assumption concerning the
Incumbent MFI. Microfinance has been invented for humanitarian reasons. It
was thought as a possible poverty reducing tool, based on the idea that poor
people have a relevant but unexplored amount of entrepreneurial skills that
ought to be used: poor must be helped to help themselves.
This is probably the reason why microfinance markets are characterized
by a heterogeneous population of institutions, spanning from small volun-
teer based humanitarian projects to big international financial institution and
banks. A critical analysis of the real motivations inducing international banks
to downscale to microfinance is beyond the scope of this paper. Nonethe-
less, an economic theory on microfinance cannot put aside the fact that some
important players in the game may not be merely profit maximizing.
Indeed, empirical evidence shows that in many cases the very first MFIs
entering, or even creating the market were not profit-maximizing institutions.
Their first, declared goal was to make their customers better off. It seems
therefore appropriate to consider in our model also MFIs striving for an effi-
cient way to properly serve their clients without incurring substantial capital
losses.
Some of these benevolent MFIs did a pretty good job, and their success
attracted the attention of other institutions, with completely different goals
and often profit maximizing behavior.
In this section we model a situation in which a socially motivated Incum-
bent is followed by a profit maximizing Entrant. Our goal is to understand
how and if the presence of an altruistic firm influences the Entrant’s strategy,
the borrower welfare and the market equilibrium.
There are different possible ways to model altruistic behavior. We consider
two instances. First, we assume that the Incumbent’s altruism leads to the
maximization of the sum of his clients utility, subject to a non-bankruptcy
constraint (NBC). We label this behavior as Naive Altruism, since the Incum-
bent takes into account only the direct effects his strategy has on his own
clients. This assumption is useful to describe small project-based programs,
endowed with less resources and technical knowledge. Second, we consider a
different form of altruism that we label as Smart Altruism. This is the behav-
ior of an MFI that takes into account also the effect her strategy has on the
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Entrant’s clients. Therefore, a smart MFI maximizes the sum of the utilities
of all the borrowers in the market. This second behavioral assumption fits
better a market in which the Incumbent MFI is a larger institution running a
well structured program.
Naive Altruism: Consider first a naive altruistic Incumbent. She solves
the following problem:
max
DI ,xI
XI(CI , CE(CI), α)[m − P (CI , CE(CI))DI ] (1.11)
subject to:
BI(CI , CE(CI))xI [P (CI , CE(CI))DI − 1] ≥ 0 NBC
The Entrant’s behavior is the same described in Section 1.3 and, as before,
the altruistic Incumbent takes into account her reaction when she chooses her
best strategy.
The solution of this problem is quite simple. Suppose for a moment that
the Incumbent MFI has complete information about the borrower types, so
that she can screen them. Whatever her preferred sector is, she sets her
contract so as to leave her customers the highest possible utility while taking
into account the NBC. The maximal utility she can give to her customers
without going bankrupt is (1 − β)(m − 1) if she serves the Risky, β(m − 1)
if she serves the Safe, and α(m− 1) if she serves Both types. By assumption
α > max{β, 1−β}, which implies that a perfectly informed Incumbent always
prefers to serve both types.
If the Incumbent’s information is incomplete, she can still ensure his cus-
tomers the payoff α(m−1) serving both types. This is simply done by setting
DI = 1
βps+(1−β)pr . It is the value that makes her NBC binding. There are
no other screening issues to deal with. Moreover, the Entrant cannot under-
cut the Incumbent’s offer, or she would make negative profits. On the other
hand, the borrower welfare attainable serving only Risky or only Safe clients
is surely smaller than (1 − β)(m − 1) and β(m− 1), since to make screening
possible some information rent has to be given to the Risky types, and some
Safe borrowers are necessarily rationed. We can then conclude that targeting
Both types is a strictly dominating strategy for a Naive Altruistic Incumbent.
This simple model shows that an MFI concerned only with her customers’
welfare has no incentive whatsoever to engage in a screening strategy. Trying
to differentiate her offer from that of the Entrant can only decrease her pos-
itive impact on borrowers. Depending on the values of the parameters, the
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Entrant’s reaction is either to serve the residual demand of the Risky types
or the residual demand of Both types.
In general the benefits of such behavior for the market considered as a
whole, are not necessarily higher than the benefits the same market would
have if the Incumbent maximized her profit. This is particularly true when the
lending capacity α is relatively small. In fact, when the Incumbent serves Both
types, the Entrant can behave as a monopolist on the residual demand. This
clearly reduces the welfare of the residual clients. But more importantly, this
behavior reduces the Entrant’s profit, potentially hampering the development
of a competitive sector and reducing outreach.10
In what follows we examine a slightly more sophisticated type of altruism,
leading the MFI to consider the effects of her strategy on the welfare of the
whole pool of borrowers. We discuss the advantages and disadvantages of such
an assumption, together with the implications in terms of policy.
Smart Altruism: The second possible type of altruism we consider consists
in the maximization of the total borrower welfare. As sketched above, a smart
altruistic MFI is concerned with the welfare of her clients and with the welfare
of the customers served by her competitor. In other words, she takes into
account the consequences her strategy has on the Entrant’s behavior and on
her customers. As we will see, this different perspective can lead to different
types of equilibria, in which MFIs specialize in different market niches.
A smart altruistic Incumbent faces the maximization problem:
max
DI ,xI
XI(CI , CE(CI), α)[m − P (CI , CE(CI))DI ]+ (1.12)
XE(CI , CE(CI), α)[m − P (CE(CI), CI)DE(CI)]
subject to:
BI(CI , CE(CI))xI [P (CI , CE(CI))DI − 1] ≥ 0 NBC
The Incumbent has again three options: serve the Safe borrowers (inducing
screening), serve the Risky ones (also inducing screening), or target both
10We could speculate that this reduction has negative consequences in terms of total
welfare, especially because lower profits might discourage potential investors from entering
the market. But in the model we have no such things as fixed entry cost, so that no formal
arguments can be given. Still we can conjecture that the presence of entry costs would only
make our result non valid for some values of the parameters, not adding any intuition. For
specific values the Incumbent could blockade entry, and the analysis would be trivial. For
some others, she would accommodate, and our results would apply
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types. The option of serving the residual demand is clearly always dominated.
In what follows, we analyze in more detail these possibilities.
Consider first the case in which she serves Both types of borrowers. There
are no screening issues and the Incumbent’s altruism has no effect on the
Entrant’s customers. To maximize the borrowers’ utility the Incumbent sets
DI as low as possible, so that the NBC binds, and xI as high as possible, so
that the capacity constraint binds. We have therefore:
Db =
1
βps + (1− β)pr
The Entrant is left with the residual demand and the total borrower welfare
depends on whether ΠResR > ΠResB or vice versa.
Let DImin be the minimal value of D
I making the Entrant indifferent be-
tween the screening profit and the best outside option. In the next lemma we
show how the Incumbent behaves if her goal is to induce screening.
Lemma 4. If the Incumbent behaves as a Smart Altruistic MFI and she wants
to induce screening, she optimally sets:
• DI = 1/ps if she wants to serve the Safe types only,
• DI = max{1/pr,DImin + ǫ} if she wants to serve the Risky types only,
Proof. See Appendix 1.6
The lemma above shows how an altruistic attitude by the Incumbent can
influence the strategic behavior of the profit maximizing Entrant. First of
all, the Incumbent’s altruism renders the most interesting Entrant’s outside
options unfeasible. When the altruistic Incumbent serves the Safe borrowers,
the Entrant cannot undercut anymore her contract, so that the relevant out-
side option is always serving the residual demand.11 In a similar way, when
the altruistic Incumbent serves the Risky borrowers, the Entrant cannot earn
anymore ΠBoth because D
I is set as low as possible – 1/pr and D
I
min are
both smaller than Rs – so that the only alternative to screening is serving the
residual demand.
But in the latter case, the Incumbent’s altruism has also a second effect
on the Entrant’s behavior. As also explained in the proof of Lemma 4, the
Incumbent can set set DI < Rs and that makes the contract designed for the
Risky borrowers interesting also for the Safe ones. This forces the Entrant to
11Consequently in Lemma 1 the relevant value of xˆs(D
I) is either the first or the second
one.
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choose a cheaper contract in order to make screening possible. As a result, all
the borrowers are better off.
When, instead, the Incumbent specializes in the Safe borrowers, she can
only influence her own clients’ welfare. The reason is that the level of ra-
tioning the Incumbent has to choose (i.e. the value of xIs) is determined only
by the Entrant’s outside options. In other words, the Incumbent’s altruism
affects the Entrant’s profit only insofar as it changes her outside options, but
the Entrant’s contract for a given outside option, is independent of the In-
cumbent’s one. Moreover, and more importantly, an altruistic MFI serving
the safe types faces an important trade off: a lower value of D implies a lower
value of x to attain screening, so that a lower price of the loan corresponds to
more rationing. More rationing makes in turn the Entrant’s outside option of
serving the residual demand more attractive.
This mechanism makes it less attractive for a Smart Altruistic Incumbent
to specialize in the Safe borrowers. To reduce the repayment, she has to ration
more than a profit maximizing firm would do. All that, without inducing any
counterbalancing reaction of the Entrant.
Whereas a Naive Altruistic Incumbent always finds the screening strategies
less interesting than serving both types of borrowers, a Smart one would still
opt for specialization in many cases. She does so when the capacity is relatively
small. Let α¯ be the value of α making the Incumbent indifferent between
serving the Risky borrowers in a screening strategy and serving Both types.
The result is described in the next proposition:
Proposition 4. The Smart AI model has the following Subgame Perfect Equi-
libria:
• When α ≥ α¯ the Incumbent sets CI = (1,Db) and the Entrant sets
CE = (1, Rs) or C
E = (1, Rr) depending on whether ΠResR < ΠResB or
vice versa.
• When α ≤ α¯ the Incumbent serves the Risky borrowers setting CI =
(1,max{1/pr,DImin+ ǫ}) and the Entrant serves the Safe borrowers set-
ting CE = (1− ǫ,DI − ǫ) so that screening takes place.
Proof. See Appendix 1.6
The values of the threshold α¯ are calculated in the appendix. The result
is quite intuitive. When α is high, an altruistic Incumbent can have a big
impact just by serving the largest possible number of clients. But this is done
at the expense of the Safe borrowers who subsidize the Risky ones. When α
is small there are two effects. On the one hand the value of DImin increases,
35
since the Entrant’s outside option of serving the residual demand becomes
more attractive. On the other hand the impact of the Incumbent on borrower
welfare decreases. When α is small enough the second effect outweigh the
first.
It is interesting to observe that α¯ is decreasing in β. This implies that the
riskier is the market, the larger is the range of parameters for which equilibria
with screening exist.
Note that when the altruistic Incumbent serves the Risky borrowers, in
equilibrium rationing is bounded to be extremely low (xEs = 1−ǫ). In the profit
maximizing Incumbent case, when the Incumbent serves the Safe borrowers,
the number of excluded borrowers can be much higher since xˆs can take any
value in the interval [0, 1]. This is due to the fact that, the troublesome
incentive constraint is the one ensuring that the Risky borrowers do not prefer
the contract designed for the Safe. Now, when the Incumbent is altruistic,
the Risky borrowers are already given the maximal possible rent, and this
mitigates the necessity to ration the Safe ones.
This has some consequences in terms of policy. The presence of an altruis-
tic MFI has the obvious consequence of increasing borrower welfare. But many
have pointed out that it could also hamper the development of a competitive
and open financial sector. A strongly socially motivated player could indeed
discourage possible investors to enter the market, because of the extremely
harsh price competition.
In contrast to this, under our assumptions, the presence of an altruistic
MFI can also have a positive impact on the profit maximizing Entrant. In a
screening equilibrium of the AI model, the Entrant serving the Safe borrowers
can reduce rationing to the minimum. This has clearly a positive effect on
her profits. On the other hand, the Incumbent’s offer is so low that even the
Safe borrowers must be offered a rent. This clearly reduces the profit.
For a large range of the parameters, the former effect outweigh the lat-
ter, so that the Entrant is better off when the Incumbent is Altruistic. One
example is given in Figure 1.4.
The figure shows the Entrant’s profit as a function of β. We considered an
example in which 1/pr > D
I
min The dashed line Π
E
PM represents the Entrant’s
profit in the PM model when a screening equilibrium prevails. The grey
line labeled as ΠEAI shows instead the Entrant’s profit in the AI model when
she serves the Safe borrowers and the Incumbent serves the Risky ones. Let
βmax = α¯(β)
−1. Then for β < βmax – that is in the interval in which the
Altruistic Incumbent prefers to serve the Risky borrowers – ΠEAI is bigger
then ΠEPM for β big enough. That shows that the negative effect due to harsh
price competitions can be outweighed by the positive effect of less rationing.
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βmax
Β
ΠΕ 
Π.EAI
ΠEPM
Figure 1.4: Entrant Profit: Comparison AI model and PM model
The conditions needed to get this effect are quite general: α must be
relatively small and the pool of borrowers must be heterogeneous enough
(that is ps − pr must be large).12 Both conditions seems to be realistic, since
most of the MFIs only have a limited capacity at their disposal, and important
differences between groups of borrowers have repeatedly been reported.
1.5 Conclusions
Microfinance has attracted an important variety of actors, pursuing different
objectives and competing with each other to attract clients. Our model de-
scribes the interaction between these actors in a tractable framework capturing
the special features of microcredit markets.
Our results show how important it is to take into account the different
motives of MFIs. The interaction of competing MFIs leads to remarkably
different equilibria when these different objectives are taken into account.
Understanding the mechanism driving the results, and the implications it has
on potential competitors, is very important for those who are working to
enlarge the outreach and promote the development of microfinance.
12By equating ΠE in the two different models, we can solve for the value of β in which
the two curves intersect, say β∗. Then, by simple algebra, in can be shown that β∗ ∈ [0, α]
if and only if:
α ≤
pr(prRs − 1) + ps
pr(m+ prRs − 1)
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Our model also highlights a possible source of exclusion of many borrowers
from the market. We show that rationing is not only due to asymmetric
information per se, but can also be a consequence of the need of MFIs to
differentiate their products from those of the competitors.
Some of the results are sensitive to the values of the parameters (an empir-
ical investigation would surely be beneficial), but our assumptions are realistic
for the type of market we are describing. Clearly our model hinges on the as-
sumption that MFIs can only offer one contract. Although it may appear as
a strong limitation, modeling explicitly a fixed cost per contract type, would
not change our results but would add complexity.
1.6 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. Suppose the Incumbent is willing to serve the Safe borrowers
only, and that she offers the contract described in Lemma 1. We show that the
Entrant’s optimal reaction is to offer a screening contract. The values of xI we are
looking for, are easily obtained computing the profits the Entrant would get serving
the Risky borrowers only, that is whenBE(CI , CE) = 1−β His maximization problem
in this case is given by:
max
xE,DE
ΠErs = (1− β)xE(prDE − 1)
In order to have BE(CI , CE) = 1− β, we need the following conditions to hold.
DE ≤ Rr PC1
DI ≤ Rs PC2
xEpr(Rr −DE) ≥ xIpr(Rr −DI) IC1
xIps(Rs −DI) ≥ xEps(Rs −DE) IC2
Consider first the constraints PC1 and IC1. The IC1 is always binding since the left
hand side is decreasing in DE . Solving it for DE we get:
DE = Rr − x
I
xE
(Rr −DI)
What about xE? Substituting DE in the profit function we get:
ΠErs = (1−β)xE [prRr−pr
xI
xE
(Rr−DI)−1] = (1−β)(xEprRr−xE−prxI(Rr−DI))
that is clearly maximized for xE = 1 given that prRr = m > 1. So the Entrant can
set: {
xE = 1
DE = Rr − xIxr (Rr −DI)
(1.13)
38
that gives her the expected profit:
ΠErs = (1 − β)[(m− 1)− prxI(Rr −DI)] (1.14)
This profit must be compared with the Entrant’s outside options. She can:
1. Target the Risky sector, but serve only the residual demand of the Risky. It is
then optimal to setDE = Rr and x
E = 1, that gives profit (1−xI)(1−β)(m−1).
2. Target the residual demand of Both types. This leads to profit (1− xI)[β(m−
1) + (1− β)(prRs − 1)].
3. Target both types undercutting the Incumbent’s contract. This can be done
by setting xE = 1 and DE = DI . The profit is then ΠBoth = α[β(m − 1) +
(1 − β)(prRs − 1)].
Depending on the parameters and on the assumptions about the Incumbent’s behav-
ior, one of these three options dominates the others. When ΠResR prevails, we need
this condition to hold for the Entrant to engage in screening:
(1 − β)[(m− 1)− prxIs(Rr −DIs)] > (1− α)(1 − β)(m − 1) (1.15)
Note that the right hand side is pre-multiplied by (1 − α) and not by 1 − xI . If we
had 1 − xI the inequality would be trivially satisfied and the Incumbent would set
xI as high as possible and surely higher than α. So in case of deviation the capacity
constraint would surely bind. Solving the inequality for xI we find the threshold:
xˆs :=
α(m− 1)
m− prDI (1.16)
When ΠEResB is the relevant option, the following condition is needed:
(1− β)[(m− 1)− prxI(Rr −DI)] > (1− α)[β(m− 1) + (1− β)(prRs − 1)] (1.17)
and solving for xI we get:
xˆs :=
(1− β)(m− 1)− (1− α)[β(m − 1) + (1− β)(prRs − 1)]
(1− β)pr(Rr −DI) (1.18)
Finally, when ΠBoth is the dominant option, we need the following condition to hold
for the Entrant to engage in screening:
(1 − β)[(m− 1)− prxI(Rr −DI)] > α[β(m− 1) + (1− β)(prRs − 1)] (1.19)
Solving the inequality for xI we find the threshold:
xˆs :=
(1− β)(m− 1)− α[β(m− 1) + (1 − β)(prRs − 1)]
(1− β)pr(Rr −DI) (1.20)
Note that in all these cases xˆs is not necessarily in [0, 1). If xˆs is greater than one, then
screening is clearly possible for any xI < 1. We still have to show that these values
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of xˆIs make screening possible. We have to verify that given the optimal reaction
of the Entrant, the value xˆs satisfies also condition (IC2). Replacing x
E = 1 and
DE = Rr − xIxE (Rr −DI) in the IC2 we get:
xI(Rs −DI) ≥ [Rs −Rr + xI(Rr −DI)]⇒ xI(Rs −Rr) ≥ Rs −Rr
that is satisfied for any xI ∈ [0, 1).
Proof of Lemma 2. Suppose that the Incumbent wants to specialize in the Risky
sector inducing the Entrant to serve the Safe sector and to offer an incentive com-
patible contract. In this case the Entrant solves this maximization problem:
max
xE ,DE
ΠEsr = βx
E(psD
E − 1)
To have BE(CI , CE) = β, the following conditions must be fulfilled:
DE ≤ Rs PC1
DI ≤ Rr PC2
xIpr(Rr −DI) ≥ xEpr(Rr −DE) IC1
xEps(Rs −DE) ≥ xIps(Rs −DI) IC2
We have to consider two possible cases: (i) the Incumbent sets DI ≥ Rs; (ii) the
Incumbent sets DI < Rs. We show that as long as D
I > Rs the Incumbent can
raise the Entrant’s profit from screening by setting a lower DI . But if DI < Rs the
Entrant’s profit might decrease because a lower DE (necessary to have screening) is
only in part compensated by a higher xE .
(i) DI ≥ Rs. This is the relevant case when the Incumbent is profit maximizing.
Consider first the IC2. When DI ≥ Rs the RHS is negative, and the PC binds. Thus
the Entrant can set DE = Rs. In order to attain screening, IC1 must be satisfied.
Solving it for xE we find the condition:
xE ≤ x
I(Rr −DI)
Rr −DE := xˆs (1.21)
that is binding at the optimum. Notice that if DI = Rr, (1.21) is true only for
xE = 0. So the Incumbent must offer a contract with DI < Rr. The expected
Entrant’s profits are then:
ΠEsr = βxˆs(m− 1) (1.22)
This must be compared with the Entrant’s outside options. She can:
1. Target both types offering a non incentive compatible contract characterized
by DE = Rs and x
E = 1. This strategy gives profit ΠEbr = α(β(m − 1) + (1 −
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β)(prRs− 1)). In this case, for the Incumbent to prefer serving the Safe types,
we need ΠEsr ≥ ΠEbr . In formulas:
βxE(m−1) ≥ α(β(m−1)+(1−β)(prRs−1)) =⇒ xE ≥ α(1+(1− β)(prRs − 1)
β(m− 1) )
Replacing xE with (1.21) we get:
DI ≤ Rr − α
xI
[
1 +
(1− β)(prRs − 1)
β(m− 1)
]
(Rr −Rs) := DˆI
2. Target the Risky sector, undercutting the Incumbent: also in this case, as
showed above, to induce screening the Incumbent must setDI = Rr−xE/xI(Rr−
Rs). We can determine the relevant value of x
E by solving the inequality :
βxE(m− 1) ≥ (1 − β)[(m− 1)− prxE(Rr −Rs)] =⇒
xE ≥ (1− β)(m − 1)
β(m− 1) + (1− β)(m− prRs) .
Now replacing again xE with (1.21) we get:
DI ≤ Rr − 1
xI
[ (1− β)(m− 1)
β(m− 1) + (1 − β)(m− prRs)
]
(Rr −Rs) := DˆI
If we define
x˜E := max
{
α(1 +
(1− β)(prRs − 1)
β(m− 1) ),
(1− β)(m− 1)
β(m− 1) + (1− β)(m− prRs)
}
then DˆI(x˜E) gives the upper bound for DI .
(ii) DI < Rs. This case is relevant when the Incumbent is altruistic. We can rewrite
the incentive constraints when the Incumbent sets DI ≤ Rs and xI = 1:
xEps(Rs −DE) ≥ ps(Rs −DI) ⇒ DE ≤ Rs − Rs
xE
+
DI
xE
pr(Rr −DI) ≥ xEpr(Rr −DE) ⇒ DE ≥ Rr − Rr
xE
+
DI
xE
The equations above delimit an interval of contracts satisfying both incentive con-
straints. Note that for xE < 1 this interval for DE exists and has a strictly positive
measure. So, for any contract offered by the Incumbent with DI < Rs, the Entrant
can make screening possible by choosing xE < 1 and DE = DI − ǫ, with ǫ ∈ R+,
making the safe borrower’s incentive constraints binding. By doing that she earns
Πsr ∼= xEβ(psDI − 1). She chooses this strategy iff that gives her a higher profit
than the possible outside options: serving the residual demand or undercutting the
Incumbent’s contract. Let then DImin be the minimal value ofD
I making the Entrant
indifferent between the screening profit and the outside option. That gives the lower
bound for DI .
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Proof of Lemma 3. First notice that when the Incumbent chooses not to special-
ize, she has no incentives not to use her whole capacity. But she has to set a contract
such that undercutting is uninteresting for the Entrant. This contract is defined by
the couple (xIb , D
I
b ) that makes the Entrant indifferent between serving the residual
demand (at monopolist prices) and pricing just below the Incumbent’s conditions. In
other words the contract has to satisfy the condition:
max{ΠResR,ΠResB} = α[β(psDIb − 1) + (1 − β)(prDIb − 1)]
The value of DIB is then obtained by solving the equation:
DIb =
max{ΠResR,ΠResB}+ α
α[βps + (1− β)pr]
Proof of Proposition 1. It can be shown that equations (1.8), (1.9) and (1.10)
have a common intersection at the point
β =
m− prRs
2m− 1− prRs := β
c.
Note that the value above is well defined since it lies always in the interval [0, 1]. This
is enough to show that screening is a Nash equilibrium at least in one point. We now
prove that screening equilibria exist over a larger range of parameters. We do it by
showing that under the conditions stated in the Proposition, there exist an interval
of β for which the functions ΠIrs and/or Π
I
sr lie above Π
I
b (see Figure 1.2 and 1.3).
First of all, note that: (i) the functions ΠResR and ΠResB are linear in β, the former
being decreasing and the latter increasing, so that the function (1.10) describes a
weakly convex ‘v-shaped’ curve; (ii) the curves ΠIrs and Π
I
sr are first increasing and
then decreasing, always concave in β. In fact, from equation (1.8) we have:
∂ΠIsr
∂β
=
(m− 1)2 + (m− 1)α(m− prRs)
m− prRs −
α(m− 1)2
(m− prRs)(1 − β)2
that is positive for β < 1− α(m−1)√
α(m−1)(mα−1+pr(Rr−Rsα))
and negative otherwise. The
second derivative is given by:
∂2ΠIsr
∂β2
=
2α(m− 1)2
pr(Rr −Rs)(β − 1)3
that is always negative since β < 1. Similarly, from equation (1.9) we have:
∂ΠIrs
∂β
=
α(m − prRs)(prRs − 1) + β2[α(m− prRs)2 − (m− 1)2]
β2(m− 1)
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that is positive for β <
√
α(m−prRs)(prRs−1)√
α(m−prRs)2−(m−1)2
and negative otherwise. The second
derivative is given by:
∂2ΠIrs
∂β2
= −2α(m− prRs)(prRs − 1)
β3(m− 1)
that is also always negative. For screening equilibria to exist over an interval of
β, we need ΠIrs and Π
I
sr to cross Π
I
b(β) twice. We already know one intersection
point, βc, so we have to find the second one. Consider first ΠIsr(β) and note that
(i) the function crosses ΠResR also in the point β = 1 − α; (ii) the function crosses
ΠResB also in the point β =
(1−α)(prRs−1)
α(m−prRs)+(prRs−1) . We have two cases to take into
account. First, the functions cross in a point in which ΠResR > ΠResB . Since
ΠIB(β) = max{ΠResR,ΠResB}, we need βc to be bigger than 1 − α. This happens
iff α ≥ m−12m−prRs−1 . Second, the functions cross in a point in which ΠResB > ΠResR.
Then we need βc to be on the left of this point. This happens iff α ≤ prRs−1
m−1 .
Consider now ΠIrs(β) and note that (i) the function crosses ΠResR also in the point
β = 1 (ii) the function crosses ΠResB also in the point β =
α(prRs−1)
(m−1)−α(m−prRs) . We have
again two cases. First, the functions cannot cross in a point in which ΠResR > ΠResB
since βc < 1. Second, the functions cross in a point in which ΠResB > ΠResR. So the
point β = α(prRs−1)(m−1)−α(m−prRs) must lie on the right of β
c. This happens iff α ≤ m−prRs
m−1 .
In all these situations, given the properties of ΠIrs and Π
I
sr, the set Θ is an interval
with a strictly positive measure.
Proof of Proposition 2. Suppose first that the parameters are such that the In-
cumbent prefers to engage in a screening strategy serving the Safe borrowers. In that
case the safe borrowers get zero rent, whereas the Risky ones enjoy a positive rent
given by (1 − β)prxˆs(Rs)(Rr − Rs). On the firms’ side, the Incumbent earns ΠIsr =
βxˆs(Rs)(m− 1) and the Entrant earns ΠEsr = (1− β)[(m− 1)− prxˆs(Rs)(Rr −Rs)].
Summing up and simplifying we get:
Wsr = βxˆs(Rs)(m− 1) + (1− β)(m− 1)
When the Incumbent is profit maximizer, xˆs(Rs) =
(1−β)(m−1)−ΠBoth
(1−β)pr(Rr−DI) . This value
is in the interval [0, 1] only if ΠRisky > ΠBoth. This means, if the Incumbent were
a monopolist, she would serve only the risky borrowers setting DI = Rr, so that
all the borrowers would get zero rent. Thus, total welfare would correspond to the
monopolist profit ΠRisky , that is clearly smaller than Wsr .
Suppose now that the parameters are such that the Incumbent prefers to engage in
a screening strategy serving the Risky borrowers. Also in this case the Safe borrowers
get zero rent, and the Risky ones get (1− β)pr[α(1 + (1−β)(prRs−1)β(m−1) )(Rr −Rs))]. On
43
the firms’ side, the Incumbent earns ΠIrs = (1 − β)(prDˆI − 1) and the Entrant
ΠErs = ΠBoth = βα(1 +
(1−β)(prRs−1)
β(m−1) )(m− 1). Summing up and simplifying we get:
Wrs = ΠBoth + (1 − β)(m− 1)
Suppose the parameters are such that a monopolist would decide to serve both types
of borrowers. In this case only the Risky borrowers would enjoy a positive rent, so
that the total welfare would be:
W = ΠBoth + α(1 − β)pr(Rr −Rs)
that is clearly smaller than Wrs. Similarly, suppose the parameters are such that
a monopolist would serve only the Risky borrowers. The total welfare would again
correspond to the monopolist profit ΠRisky , that is also smaller than Wrs.
Proof of Proposition 3. Suppose that a monopolist, endowed with a capacity α =
1, is willing to serve both types. He optimally sets D = Rs. Then the Safe borrowers
get no rent, whereas the Risky ones enjoy a rent (1− β)pr(Rr −Rs).
In a screening equilibrium, if the Risky borrowers are served by the Incumbent,
they earn (1 − β)prxs(Rr − Rs))]. Since xs ∈ [0, 1], the Risky borrowers’ welfare is
strictly lower in a competitive regime. The Safe borrowers get zero rent under both
regimes, but they are rationed more under competition since xEβ < α.
Proof of Lemma 4. Suppose first that the Incumbent wants to serve only the Safe
sector, and that she wants to induce the Entrant to engage in a screening strategy.
As showed in Lemma 1 this is done by offering xI ≤ xˆs. We have to consider the
effects of her choice on the Safe borrowers she serves and on the Risky borrowers the
Entrant serves.
We show, first of all, that when xI = xˆs(D
I), the Entrant’s optimal contract does
not depend on the value of DI . We know that the Entrant reaction is to offer
DE = Rr − xIxE (Rr −DI). Substituting for the adequate value of xˆIs , it is very easy
to check that the value DE is independent of DI . It follows that also the Entrant’s
profit and the Risky borrowers’ welfare are independent of the Incumbent’s choice. In
other words the Incumbent’s altruism has no beneficial effects on the Risky borrowers
served by the Entrant.
So, what matters is the utility enjoyed by the Safe borrowers. Note that, in all the
cases analyzed in Lemma 1, xˆs is increasing in D
I . So, for an altruistic MFI there
is a trade-off between offering the borrowers a ‘cheaper’ contract and rationing them
more. To find the optimal solution we just need to substitute for xˆs in the objective
function, that in this case reduces to βxIps(Rs − DI). In the relevant interval this
equation is decreasing and concave in DI . The NBC reduces to βxI(psD
I − 1) ≥ 0.
The MFI chooses the lowest possible value of DI , that is the value that makes her
profit equal to zero. This is given by DI = 1/ps.
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Suppose now that the Incumbent chooses to serve the Risky sector. To maximize
the Risky borrower’s utility, the Incumbent wants to set xI as high as possible, namely
equal to one, and DI as low as possible. The value of DI that makes the NBC binding
is 1/pr. As a consequence of our assumptions 1/pr ≤ Rs. As described in Lemma 2,
the Incumbent can induce screening by setting xI = 1 andDI = max{1/pr, DImin+ǫ}.
This endows the borrowers served by the Incumbent with the highest possible rent.
At the same time, it has a positive influence on the borrowers served by the Entrant,
since tougher price competition forces her to reduce the repayment DE and increase
the value of xE .
Proof of Proposition 4. Consider first the equilibrium without screening. The
total borrower welfare when the Incumbent serves the Safe borrowers inducing the
Entrant to serve the Risky ones is given by:
¯BW sr = βxˆs(m− 1) + (1− β)(m − prDE) (1.23)
We can compare it with the borrowers’ welfare when the Incumbent serves both types,
that is given by:
BWb =
{
α(m− 1) if ΠResR > ΠResB
α(m− 1) + (1− α)(1 − β)pr(Rr −Rs) if ΠResB > ΠResR
(1.24)
We have therefore two cases to examine. Consider first the case in which the Entrant
prefers to serve the residual demand of the Risky borrower. We can replace the values
of xˆs (first formula in Lemma 1) and D
E in equation (1.23). After some computations
the formula simplifies to:
BWsr = α(m− 1)
[
− β
m− pr/ps + β
pr
ps
1
m− pr/ps + 1
]
For BWsr to be bigger than BWb we need the term in squared bracket to be bigger
than one. This happens if and only if
m− pr
ps
+ β
(pr
ps
− 1
)
> m− pr
ps
=⇒ pr
ps
> 1
that is impossible since by assumption pr < ps.
Consider now the case in which the Entrant prefers to serve the residual demand
of Both types. As above, we replace the values of xˆs (second formula in Lemma 1)
and DE in equation (1.23). The result is a strictly decreasing and concave curve in
β. Note that ΠResB > ΠResR if β ≥ m−prRs2m−prRs−1 = βc. Substituting this threshold in
(1.23) we get an upper bound:
BWsr(β
c) =
(m− 1)[2mps − pr − prm]
(psm− pr)(2m− prRs − 1)α(m− 1)
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We can prove that the first multiplier is smaller than one. This condition reduces to:
Rr
(
2− ps
pr
)
< Rs
Replacing Rr =
ps
pr
Rs in the formula above we get:
2
ps
pr
−
(
ps
pr
)2
− 1 < 0 =⇒
(
ps
pr
− 1
)2
> 0
that is clearly always satisfied. Given the monotonicity and the concavity of BWsr,
this is enough to prove that when ΠResB > ΠResR, the smart altruistic Incumbent
always prefers serving both types.
Consider now the screening equilibrium. Let ΠResR > ΠResB . Then D
I
min is the
solution to the following equation:
β(psD
I
min − 1) = (1 − α)(1 − β)(m− 1) ⇒ DImin =
(1− α)(1 − β)(m− 1) + β
βps
For the Incumbent to prefer serving the Risky types it must be that:
βps(Rs −DImin) + (1− β)pr(Rr −DImin) ≥ α(m− 1).
Solving for α we get:
α ≤
(m− 1)
[
(1 − β) + pr
psβ
(1− β)2
]
− β(m− 1)− (1− β)(m− pr
ps
)
(m− 1)
[
(1− β) + pr
psβ
(1− β)2
]
− (m− 1)
:= α¯ (1.25)
Let now ΠResB > ΠResR. Then D
I
min is the solution to the following equation:
β(psD
I
min − 1) = (1− α)(β(m − 1) + (1− β)(prRs − 1)) ⇒
DImin =
(1− α)(β(m − 1) + (1− β)(prRs − 1)) + β
βps
For the Incumbent to prefer serving the Risky types it must be that:
βps(Rs −DImin) + (1− β)pr(Rr −DImin) ≥ α(m− 1) + (1− α)(1 − β)(m− prRs).
Solving for α we get:
α ≤
pr
psβ
[β(m− 1) + (1− β)(prRs − 1)]−
(
1− pr
ps
)
pr
psβ
[β(m− 1) + (1 − β)(prRs − 1)] := α¯ (1.26)
If 1/pr > D
I
min, then by analogous reasoning we get:
(m− 1)− β(ps
pr
− 1) ≥ α(m− 1) ⇒ α ≤ 1− β ps/pr − 1
m− 1 := α¯
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when ΠResR > ΠResB and
(m− 1)− β(ps
pr
− 1) ≥ α(m− 1) + (1− α)(1 − β)(m − prRs) ⇒
α ≤ 1− β ps/pr − 1
prRs − 1 + β(m− prRs) := α¯
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Chapter 2
Competitive Microcredit
Markets: Differentiation and
ex-ante Incentives for
Multiple Borrowing
Abstract: We analyze an oligopolistic microcredit market characterized by
asymmetric information and institutions that can offer only one type of con-
tract. We study the effects of competition on contract choice when small
entrepreneurs can borrow from more than one institution due to the absence
of credit bureaus. We show that appropriate contract design can eliminate the
ex-ante incentives for multiple borrowing. Moreover, when the market is still
largely unserved and particularly risky, a screening strategy leading to con-
tract differentiation and credit rationing is unambiguously the most effective
to avoid multiple borrowing.
Keywords: Microfinance, Competition, Altruism, Credit Bureaus, Multiple
Borrowing , Credit Rationing
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2.1 Introduction
Competition is increasingly a cause for concern in microcredit markets. A
growing number of institutions enter the market, motivated by goals span-
ning from poverty reduction to profit maximization. Economists generally
welcome competition as a positive phenomenon, especially in terms of con-
sumer welfare, but some of the special features of microcredit raise some
doubts regarding this conventional wisdom.
Whenever borrowers and lenders are tied in a reciprocal relationship,
lending money without incurring important financial losses is relatively easy.
Lenders need borrowers to repay their loans in order to avoid losses. Borrow-
ers need lenders to finance their businesses and their daily activities. When
microcredit was still at its origin, this relation was quite balanced since the
supply of credit was largely insufficient, and the demand side was still lim-
ited, mainly because of distrust toward microfinance institutions. This was
enough to discipline the involved parties. But the increase of competition is
destabilizing the relation in favor of borrowers: when there are different Mi-
cro Finance Institutions (MFI) to which borrowers can apply for credit, the
link borrower-lender becomes weaker. This creates incentive for borrowers to
engage in potentially harmful behavior like, for instance, multiple borrowing.
Practitioners report that the presence of competitors in the market weak-
ens MFIs in two respects.1 First, it reduces the borrowers’ incentives for
repayment. These incentives, in fact, depend importantly on the threat of be-
ing denied access to further credit in case of default. Second, due to the lack of
well functioning credit bureaus, borrowers might take multiple loans. In these
cases, the level of indebtedness can become so large to render repayments
extremely unlikely.
This paper focuses on multiple borrowing. We analyze it in relation to
the strategic behavior of competing MFIs. Our goal is to understand how
the contracts chosen by competing MFIs can affect borrowers’ incentives for
multiple borrowing and how this, in turn, modifies the strategies of MFIs.
Technically, allowing borrowers to take out more than one loan is equiva-
lent to assuming that MFIs cannot share information about the borrowers they
are serving, and that borrowers do want to take multiple loans. Both assump-
tions must be considered carefully. Some Microfinance markets, especially the
ones characterized by a higher degree of competition, do show a certain level
of information sharing. Indeed, there are more and more attempts to set up
credit bureaus, as well as different examples of bilateral agreements between
1See McIntosh et al. (2005), or Armendariz and Murdoch (2005)
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MFIs to share the most relevant information. Nonetheless, practitioners re-
port that in most markets borrowers do take multiple loans and hide their
real level of indebtedness. As a consequence, making reliable assessments of
credit risk becomes more difficult and, thus, important financial losses are
more likely to hit MFIs.
The literature has proposed mainly two different explanations for multiple
borrowing (see, for instance, McIntosh et al. (2005), McIntosh and Wydick
(2005), de Janvry et al (2008)). The first is that ex-post, i.e. after the loan
is taken and invested, some unexpected negative shocks can hurt borrowers
and their businesses. This can make it impossible for them to repay the loan.
Thus, borrowers might decide to take a second loan in order to repay the first,
increasing dangerously their level of indebtedness.
A second motivation for multiple borrowing comes from the fact that
micro-loans can be too small to cover the borrowers’ needs for a specific in-
vestment. In order to obtain the missing capital, they might find it convenient
to hide their real level of indebtedness and ask for additional loans at different
institutions.
However, even ruling out negative shocks, and assuming that loans are
optimally sized, borrowers might have incentives to take multiple loans. In
fact, they might desire a second loan to invest in a different and possibly
riskier use. We take this into account by allowing borrowers to choose on
whether to undertake one or more investments. This clearly provides ex-ante
incentives for multiple borrowing.
An additional empirical motivation to justify our modeling strategy comes
from the fact that, although micro-loans are typically made to individuals,
profits, burdens and responsibilities of the investments are typically shared
within households. Many MFIs, for instance, make loans primarily to women
since they are considered safer. But empirical evidence shows that although
women are the members of the family officially taking out the loan, often
men are the ones controlling the relevant investment decisions and taking
mostly care of the business.2 Independently of that, within households it is
likely to find a certain level of solidarity. Thus, if more than one member
of the household has a loan, the probability of repayment depends on the
success of both investments. This creates an artificial correlation between
the probabilities of default and makes loans riskier. Our model can also be
interpreted as a way to take into account these circumstances, shifting the
focus from individuals to households.
The experience of several MFIs all over the world has shown that the poor
2See for instance Goetz and Sen Gupta (1996).
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are reliable borrowers. The default rate is extremely low, and in particular
total default is considered as a particularly rare event. This is due to the
fact that the repayment schedule of most micro-loans is characterized by very
frequent repayment installments, starting very early after the start of the
contract. In our model we take this feature into account and show its extreme
importance to mitigate the incentives to take multiple loans.
We use a simple credit rationing model with adverse selection in which
two MFIs compete simultaneously for a pool of heterogeneous borrowers. We
assume that MFIs can offer only one type of contract, as it typically happens in
microcredit markets. Borrowers have access to two investment opportunities,
and therefore take two different decisions: first, how many loans to take out
and, second, from which MFI to take them. Multiple borrowing leads to
a social loss in our model because of decreasing returns to scale. For ease
of exposition we first solve the model assuming that multiple borrowing is
impossible (for instance, because of the existence of an information sharing
mechanism). Then we check how the possibility to take multiple loans (or, in
other words, the absence of information sharing), changes the predictions of
the model.
Adverse selection plays an important role in our model. In fact it prevents
MFIs from extracting rent from borrowers, and as a consequence it makes the
incentives to take multiple loans much stronger than in a model of perfect
information. Moreover, even when multiple borrowing is assumed away, it
leads to separating equilibria, characterized by credit rationing, in which MFIs
specialize in one type of borrower only. That allows us to mimic some stylized
fact typical of microcredit markets.
To the best of our knowledge, the only theoretical paper tackling the prob-
lem of multiple borrowing in microcredit markets is McIntosh and Wydick
(2005). They also focus on microfinance, but their approach is different in
at least two respects: (i) they consider dynamic incentives, (ii) the incentives
to multiple borrow depend solely on an exogenous parameter measuring the
borrowers’ impatience. In other words, borrowers trade off the utility from
borrowing more today with the risk of being denied credit access tomorrow.
The choice is not influenced by the contract design. Our paper is based on a
static model and, as such, considers ex-ante incentives only. The added value
of this approach is that it allows to study how the incentives for multiple
borrowing can be controlled by appropriate contract design. These incentives
are, in fact, endogenously determined by the contracts chosen by MFIs.
Bennardo, Pagano and Piccolo (2009) consider the problem of multiple-
bank lending by considering a market in which borrowers decide on whether
to invest in a small or a big project and can appropriate part of the revenues.
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They analyze the effects of introducing an information sharing mechanism and
show how it would reduce interest rates and rationing. In our paper we rather
focus on those situation in which such mechanism is not implementable, as it
is often the case in development countries.
Fluet and Garella (2007), consider banks’ incentives to reschedule loans to
borrowers in financial distress. They assume that borrowers are indebted with
many lenders. Each lender cannot observe the performance of the borrowers
with the other lenders. In their model, borrowers lend from multiple sources
by assumption, since they want to finance a big scale project. Each lender
finance only a share of the whole, unique project.
Other papers study the effects of the presence of a credit bureau on bor-
rowers in terms of reputation building (see for instance Vercammen (1995)).
In this branch of the literature, credit bureaus are an important disciplining
device. De Janvry, McIntos and Sadoulet (2006), study the impact of the
implementation of a credit bureau on both demand and supply side using a
natural experiment.
The organization of the paper is the following: in the next section we
introduce the model and analyze the incentives for multiple borrowing when a
credit bureau is not at work. In Section 2.3 we describe the strategic behavior
of two competing MFIs, first assuming the existence of a perfectly functioning
credit bureau and then allowing borrowers to take multiple loans. We explain
how the strategic behavior of MFIs influences the borrower incentives to take
out more than one loan. In Section 2.4 we conclude.
2.2 The model
We model a market characterized by asymmetric information and oligopolistic
competition. We assume that, due to high management costs, each MFI can
only offer one contract.3. Contracts are chosen simultaneously. We assume
that MFIs are not perfectly symmetric in that they have different capacities.4
This assumption can be interpreted in different ways. For instance the high
capacity MFI could be a firm that entered the market beforehand, and had
3Empirical evidence shows that micronance contracts are very standardized at the firm
level. Some big and viable MFIs consider standardization as one of the main factors of their
success. For instance, ASA, in Bangladesh denes its organization as the Ford Motor Model
of Micronance. Grameen Bank, probably the most celebrated Micronance Institution in the
world, offers loans with a unique interest rate, namely 16%. In general, MFIs operating
in competive markets offer extremely few contract types, and often only one. See Casini
(2009a) for a wider discussion
4This asymmetry allows to avoid the use of mixed strategies.
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therefore more time to accumulate capital. Alternatively the high capacity
institution could be a ‘normal’ bank downscaling her business into a market
that has previously been pioneered by a small NGO.
More formally, we consider a market in which two MFIs, say a and b,
are operating. We assume that each MFI is endowed with a capacity αj ,
j ∈ {a, b}. Without loss of generality let αa > αb. Finally, let αa + αb ≤ 1,
so that the market is not necessarily fully covered.5 There is a unit measure
of borrowers demanding a loan, whose size is, for simplicity, set to one. Each
borrower can be interpreted as a single individual or as a household. There are
two potential investment opportunities in the market, available to everybody.
Both investments give the same return to a given borrower, but we assume
that only one of them can be given priority. In other words, we assume
that borrowers exert a bigger effort in one investment, that is successful with
probability p, and only residual effort in the second one, that is successful
with probability p′, where p′ ≤ p. This is equivalent to assuming decreasing
returns to scale. The level of effort is exogenously given.
There is fraction β of Safe borrowers, characterized by a return Rs and a
probability of success ps for the first investment and p
′
s for the second, with
p′s ≤ ps. The remaining 1 − β borrowers are Risky and are characterized by
a return Rr and probabilities of success pr and p
′
r, p
′
r ≤ pr, on the first and
second investment respectively. We also set psRs = prRr = m, ps > pr and
p′s > p
′
r. Hence, Rs < Rr. This makes sure that all borrowers have the same
expected return, so that MFIs are ex-ante indifferent between them. Note
that, under our assumptions, multiple borrowing is inefficient since a part of
the scarce financial resources is allocated to project with a lower probability
of success. Nonetheless, MFIs could prefer serving twice the safe borrowers
when p′s > pr.
Let xi ∈ [0, 1] denote the fraction of the demand MFI i is willing to serve
or, equivalently, the probability for each borrower to obtain the scarce funds.
We can define a contract as a pair Ci = (xi,Di), in which MFIs specify the
repayment Di, inclusive of principal and interests, and the probability xi for
a borrower to be served. Each MFI offers only one contract. The borrower
type is private information. We use two tie-breaking rules: first, we assume
that if a contract leaves the borrowers with no rent, they still prefer borrowing
to not borrowing; second, we assume that MFIs prefer serving both types of
borrowers rather than targeting the residual demand if that gives them the
5This assumption is not necessary to prove the existence of screening equilibria. Nonethe-
less it is useful for the exposition since it ensures that an equilibrium in pure strategies of
the PM model, be it with or without screening, always exists.
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same profit.6
2.2.1 Incentives for Multiple Borrowing
Most of the credit rationing models that followed Stiglitz and Weiss (1981)’
seminal contribution assume that borrowers can take out one loan only. This
is equivalent to assuming that either MFIs can share information about the
borrowers they are serving, or that borrowers do not want to take multiple
loans. Both assumptions must be considered carefully when examining micro-
credit markets. Although there exist examples of information sharing through
the creation of credit bureaus, the amount of information available to MFIs
is generally scarce.7 In countries like India, for instance, people are not even
registered at birth, so that most of the inhabitants of rural areas are not
identifiable through an ID. In this situations MFIs can only rely on informal
sources of information (like personal knowledge) to asses on the credit history
of potential borrowers. As a consequence, in many markets borrowers do take
multiple loans by hiding their real level of indebtedness.8 This can lead to in-
correct risk assessment by MFIs and, as a consequence, to important financial
losses.
In what follows we formalize the behavior of borrowers when, due to lack
of information sharing, multiple borrowing is possible. In order to do it we
assume that borrowers take out at most one loan from each MFI9. As stan-
dard in similar models, we exclude strategic default, that is we assume that
borrowers repay their loan whenever they can. On top of that, we assume that
borrowers repay their loans as much as they can, even when they cannot pay
back the whole capital. In other words, partial reimbursements are allowed10.
Each loan is invested in a distinct and independent business. The return
on investments is strictly related to types: a Risky borrower gets the same
return on all the investment she makes. But we assume that one of the
two investments has a lower probability of being reimbursed. This can be
either interpreted as excessive level of investment by the borrowers, or as
inability to properly manage two projects at the same time. A different way
to read this assumption is to interpret borrowers as members of a household.
6This rule is only relevant for non-screening equilibria.
7see for instance de Janvry, McIntosh and Sadoulet (2008).
8see for instance McIntosh, de Janvry and Sadoulet (2005).
9Later we show that in equilibrium MFIs do not want to multi-lend
10Evidence shows that borrowers almost never totally default on their loans. This is
mainly a consequence of the fact that most MFIs offer loans whose repayment is done by
very frequent instalments, starting almost immediately after the issue. Thus total default is
considered a rare event. See, for instance, Armendariz & Morduch page 31 and ss)
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Each household has a primary business, in which much of the efforts and
resources are invested, and a secondary one to which only the residual assets
are dedicated.
We keep the implicit assumption that the loan size offered by the MFI is
the optimal one, so that no borrower wants to invest more money in the same
project. In other words, investing more resources in the same business does
not increase the probability of success. This clearly rules out the incentives to
multi-borrow arising from imperfect contract design, allowing us to identify
the pure effects generated by competition and adverse selection. For the time
being, suppose that applications for credit are committing: if a borrower
applies for a loan and the application is accepted, she cannot decline the
contract. We also assume that Rr <
2
pr
, so that being successful in only one
investment is not enough to repay two loans.11
If a borrower applies for only one loan from MFI i, she enjoys the following
ex-ante utility:
Uj(C
i) = xipj(Rj −Di) with j = s, r and i = a, b
since she attains the loan with probability xi, earns Rj with probability pj, in
which case she repays Di.
Suppose now that a Risky borrower applies for credit at both MFIs simul-
taneously. Since we allow for partial reimbursements, the ex-ante utility she
gets from applying for two different loans is given by the weighed sum of the
utility she gets in four mutually exclusive cases:
1- The borrower applies at both MFIs and both applications are accepted:
xaxb[pr(1− p′r)Rr + p′r(1− pr)Rr + 2prp′rRr+
−pr(1− p′r)Rr − p′r(1− pr)Rr − p′rpr(Da +Db)]
2- She applies at both MFIs but only a accepts the application:
xa(1− xb)pr(Rr −Da)
3- She applies at both MFIs but only b accepts the application:
xb(1− xa)pr(Rr −Db)
4- She applies at both MFIs and none of the application is accepted: in this
case the expected utility is simply zero.
11Note that setting Di = 1
pr
, an MFI serving the Risky borrowers only would make zero
profit. Thus, our assumption makes sure that being successful in one investment only is not
enough to repay two loans.
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Summing up the equations above we get:
prp
′
rx
axb(2Rr−Db−Da)+xb(1−xa)pr(Rr−Db)+xa(1−xb)pr(Rr−Da) (2.1)
We can compare this equation with the expected utility a Risky borrower
enjoys by applying at one MFI only. Suppose, without loss of generality, that
the Risky borrowers prefer the contract offered by a. Then equation (2.1)
must be compared to xapr(Rr −Da). Rearranging the formulas, it is easy to
see that the condition for the Risky borrowers not to prefer to multi-borrow
is given by:
(Rr −Db)[1− xa(1− p′r)] < xa(Rr −Da)(1− p′r) (2.2)
Similar calculations can be made for the Safe types assuming, without loss
of generality, that they prefer the contract offered by MFI b. This leads to
the analogous condition:
(Rs −Da)[1− xb(1− p′s)] < xb(Rs −Db)(1 − p′s) (2.3)
Note that for p′s and p
′
r small enough, the conditions are jointly satisfied
when xa and xb are high. In other words, a higher level of rationing can
increase the borrower incentives to apply for credit at different MFIs simulta-
neously.
The calculations above hinge on the assumption that borrowers repay their
loans as much as they can. That is, even if they do not have money enough to
repay both loans, they refund the MFIs at least partially. As discussed above,
this is a very important feature of microfinance markets.
Note that we did not assume any criterion to establish which MFI has
priority in case of partial reimbursement. In general, the ranking can be made
dependent on the borrowers preferences. But the conditions stated above
do not depend on borrower preferences about which MFI to give priority
to. There could obviously be several motivations for a borrower to prefer
repaying first one MFI rather than the other (different dynamic incentives,
different enforcement power etc.). But this is immaterial for this part of the
analysis. In our static set-up, any assumption in this respect would influence
MFIs’ profits rather than borrower utility.
Multiple borrowing produces a considerable reduction of the total welfare.
From the MFIs point of view, the loss is determined by the higher probability
of defaults. From the borrowers point of view, the most apparent consequence
of multiple lending is the exclusion of a higher number of borrowers. In fact,
given the capacity constraint of the MFIs, if borrowers take more than one
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loan, then less individuals can be served. This loss outweighs the gain in terms
of utility of the borrowers that do access credit. In fact, the low probability
of repaying the second loan ensures that the same amount of money gives
in the aggregate more utility if it is invested by two different individuals (or
households).
The conditions stated above depend on the contract chosen by both MFIs.
That allows us to investigate whether there exist competitive equilibria in
which MFIs offer contracts that eliminate the incentives to multi-borrowing.
We consider the case in which two profit maximizing MFIs compete in the
market. This set-up describes a mature microcredit market like the ones, for
instance, in Bangladesh or Bolivia.12
2.3 The Equilibria
Some of the most celebrated and imitated MFIs are profit maximizing or, at
least, so they claim. In large part, Microfinance has become famous because
of its promise of being able to effectively reduce poverty while running a
profitable business. But very few MFIs actually manage to earn profit. Still,
profit seeking is considered by many practitioners as a ‘best practice’ for the
success of a microfinance program. For this reason, we assume that both MFIs
are profit maximizing.The solution of this model provides a useful benchmark
allowing us to draw some interesting policy conclusions.
For ease of exposition, we first solve the model by assuming that multiple
borrowing is not possible, because of perfect information sharing between
MFIs. We then relax this hypothesis to show the existence of equilibria in
which borrowers do not want to take multiple loans.
We prove the existence of two different types of equilibria. The first type
is characterised by screening whereas the second one is a pooling equilibrium
in which no screening takes place. We will not consider equilibria in mixed
strategies.
2.3.1 No Multiple Borrowing
Define a function Bi(·, ·) : (R+ × [0, 1]) × (R+ × [0, 1]) → [0, 1], assigning to
each combination of contracts the mass of borrowers preferring MFI i. Let
P i(·, ·) : (R+ × [0, 1]) × (R+ × [0, 1]) → [0, 1] be the mapping assigning to
each combination of contracts the probability of repayment of MFI i’s pool
12For a detailed analysis of the case in which an altruistic MFI is in the market, see Casini
(2009a) and (2009b).
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of clients. It takes value pr, ps or pb := βps + (1 − β)pr when the MFI
serves respectively the Risky, the Safe or Both types of borrowers. Finally, let
Xi(Ca, Cb, αi) := min{xiBi(Ca, Cb), αi} denote the mass of borrowers served
by i. MFI i faces the following maximization problem:
max
Ci
Πi = Xi(Ca, Cb, αi)
[
P (Ca, Cb)Di − 1
]
Since by assumption αi < 1, for any given strategy of i, her competitor
can always target the residual demand (1 − Xi(Ca, Cb, αi)), and impose on
it a monopoly price. For the sequel, it is useful to calculate the profit MFI a
earns serving the residual demand of the Risky types, when b faces a demand
Bb(Ca, Cb) = 1 and serves both types. a optimally sets Da = Rr, extracting
the whole surplus from the residual Risky borrowers. Since by assumption
αa < (1− αb), she earns:
ΠaResR = α
a(1− β)(m− 1). (2.4)
In the same way we can define the profit a earns serving the residual demand
of both types. She sets Da = Rs, extracting all the Safe borrower’s surplus
and leaving the Risky ones a rent. She earns:
ΠaResB = α
a[β(m− 1) + (1− β)(prRs − 1)] (2.5)
Whether ΠaResR or Π
a
ResB is bigger depends on the particular values of the
parameters. ΠbResR and Π
b
ResB are analogously defined.
We can now describe the borrowers’ reaction functions. For any given
contract chosen by the competitor, an MFI has four different choices: (i)
Offer a contract that attracts all the borrowers of a specific type and only
them (i.e. a screening contract); (ii) Undercut the competitor’s contract;
(iii) Target the residual demand of the chosen type(s); (iv) Offer a contract
that attract both types. Given the definition of ΠiResB and the assumption
αa + αb ≤ 1, the last option gives the same profit as serving the residual
demand of both types. In what follows we state the conditions supporting the
first choice, i.e. we describe under which conditions the best reaction of an
MFI is to offer a contract that allows screening.
Lemma 5. If i chooses a contract such that Di ≤ Rs and xi ≤ xˆ(Di) < 1
where xˆ(Di) is defined as:
(1− αj)(m− 1)
m− prDi if Π
j
ResR ≥ ΠjResB
(1− β)(m− 1)−ΠjResB
(1− β)(m− prDi) if Π
j
ResB ≥ ΠjResR
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then j’s optimal reaction is to offer a contract Cj = (1, Rr− xixj (Rr−Dj)), so
that screening takes place with i serving the Safe borrowers and j serving the
Risky ones.
Proof. See Appendix 2.5.
xˆi(Di) is the value of x
i making MFI j indifferent between engaging in
a screening strategy (serving the Risky borrowers only) and the best of her
outside options. The intuition behind this result is standard: if i wants to
serve only the Safe borrowers, she must ration some of them. What is less
standard is that the number of excluded borrowers depends on the prevailing
j’s outside option. A similar intuition is at the basis of the next lemma.
Lemma 6. If i offers a contract (xi,Di) characterized by:
Rs < D
i ≤ D˜i(xi) := Rr − 1
xi
x˜j(Rr −Dj) (2.6)
where
x˜j := max
{
αj
(
1 +
(1− β)(prRs − 1)
β(m− 1)
)
,
(1− β)(m− 1)
β(m− 1) + (1− β)(m− prRs)
}
then j’s optimal reaction is to offer a contract Cj = (x˜j , Rs), so that screening
takes place with i serving the Risky borrowers and j serving the Safe ones.
Proof. See Appendix 2.5.
Again, the intuition is standard: to obtain screening, Risky borrowers
must be given better conditions via a reduction of the repayment Dj (the
informational rent). At the same time some of the Safe borrowers must be
rationed.
When the conditions in lemmas 5 and 6 are not satisfied, options (ii), (iii)
and (iv) in the taxonomy above are relevant. Let ΠjUR := (1 − β)[(m − 1) −
prx
j(Rr − Rs)] be the profit MFI j can earn by undercutting MFI i when
Ci = (1,Di), with Di > Rs. This is the profit that MFI i would earn in
a screening equilibrium. Next lemma describes the best responses in these
cases.
Lemma 7. (i) If Di ≤ Rs and 1 > xi > xˆ(Di), then j’s optimal reaction is to
set Cj = (1, Rs) when ΠResB > ΠResR and C
j = (1, Rr) when ΠResR > ΠResB.
(ii) If Di > D˜i(xi), then j’s optimal reaction is to set Cj = (1, Rs) when
ΠResB > Π
j
UR and C
j = (1,Di) when ΠjUR > ΠResB.
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Figure 2.1: MFI i Strategies as a function of Cj
Proof. It follows immediately from the proofs of lemmas 5 and 6.
An important implication of the lemmas above (whose results are repre-
sented in Figure 2.1) is that if specialization is an equilibrium in a microfinance
market, then it is an equilibrium with credit rationing. This rationing is due
to the combined effect of adverse selection and oligopolistic competition. Dif-
ferent than in Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), where rationing is a consequence of
the presence of ‘bad’ types in the market, in our model the value of x is de-
termined by the outside option of the competitor. In Lemma 5, i chooses the
level of rationing in order to make the screening strategy optimal for j. In
Lemma 6, i increases the information rent offered to the Risky borrowers in
order to reduce rationing of the Safe ones and increase j’s profit.
Let j be the MFI serving the Risky borrowers. Knowing the MFIs’ reaction
functions, we can now describe the conditions making screening equilibria
possible.
Proposition 5. Suppose that αj ≥ (1 − β) for j ∈ {a, b}. Then, in the
simultaneous model, when the following condition is satisfied:
x˜i < xˆ(Rs) (2.7)
for i 6= j, i ∈ {a, b}, there exist a screening equilibrium in which MFI i serves
the Safe types setting Ci = (xˆ(Rs), Rs) and MFI j serves the Risky types
setting Cj = (1, D˜j(1)).
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Proof. See Appendix 2.5
Screening is only possible when the capacity of the MFI serving the Risky
types is high enough to serve them all. Where it not the case, some of the
Risky borrowers would apply for credit to the MFI targeting the Safe borrow-
ers making the equilibrium unsustainable. Interestingly, screening equilibria
are more likely to exist when the level of heterogeneity is high. In fact, x˜is is
increasing in Rs, whereas the threshold defined in Proposition 5 is decreasing.
For a given value of m, an increase of Rs can be interpreted as a reduction
of the level of heterogeneity. The result is then quite intuitive: when hetero-
geneity is high, the opportunity cost of serving the ‘wrong’ type is larger.
Note that to prove this result we make no use of the assumption αa+αb ≤
1. Indeed the result is valid more generally. Nonetheless, the more αa differs
from αb, the larger is the range of parameters for which screening equilibria
exist. Moreover, the high capacity MFI is more likely to serve the Risky types
in equilibrium. This is particularly true when αa > max{β, 1 − β}. It is
easy to show that in this case αb is smaller than 1 − β.13 So if a targets the
Risky, b’s outside options to the screening strategy (in particular the option
of undercutting a) are clearly less interesting.
What happens when the conditions in Proposition 5 are not satisfied?
We can show that under our hypothesis, there always exists a pooling Nash
equilibrium in which MFIs do not screen the borrowers. In order to prove it,
define D∗(i) as the repayment such that:
αi[β(psD
∗(i)− 1) + (1− β)(prD∗(i)− 1)] = max{ΠiResR,ΠiResB}
D∗(i) is the repayment such that the profit from serving both types is equal to
the profit from serving the residual demand. We can introduce the following
proposition:
Proposition 6. The pair of contracts Ca = (1,D∗(b)), Cb = (1,D∗(b)), is a
Nash equilibrium of the simultaneous game with profit maximizing MFIs.
Proof. See Appendix 2.5
This last result hinges on the hypothesis that αa + αb ≤ 1. As showed in
the proof, this implies that D∗(a) = D∗(b) so that no MFI has incentives to
deviate. The hypothesis on the capacity constraints is not unrealistic since
despite the rapid increase of credit supply in development countries, many
13Let β > (1− β). Then αa > β ⇒ 1− αa < 1− β ⇒ αb < (1− β).
If instead β < (1− β), then αa > (1− β) ⇒ 1− αa < β ⇒ αb < β ⇒ αb < (1− β)
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markets are still not saturated, and most MFIs are still struggling to increase
their outreach. Note that the equilibrium described above always exists. Thus,
for some parameters, the model has multiple equilibria.
2.3.2 Multiple Borrowing Allowed
In Section 2.2.1 we showed how the incentive for borrowers to take multiple
loans depends on the contracts available in the market. Clearly, the decision
concerning which contract to offer depends on the competitive interaction
between MFIs. In this section we reconsider the equilibria described above to
see how and if the prediction we made in the previous section are influenced
by the existence of agreements to share information. We show that for a large
range of parameters the screening equilibria are robust to this assumption.
In the simultaneous model with two profit maximizing firms, we showed
that there exist equilibria in which screening takes place. In these equilibria
the MFI targeting the Safe types, say MFI i, sets xi < 1 and Di as high as
possible, namely equal to Rs. The competing MFI j serves instead the Risky
borrowers setting xj = 1 and Dj low enough in order to leave them with the
necessary informational rent.
We characterized these equilibria in a model in which we assumed that
MFIs have perfect information about the borrowers’ level of indebtedness.
We now want to check whether, and under which conditions, these equilibria
are robust to changes in the informational structures. In other words, we want
to understand whether the screening contracts described above create ex-ante
incentives for multiple-borrowing. We know from Section 2.2.1 that in order
to avoid multiple borrowing the following conditions must be simultaneously
satisfied (these are simply conditions (2.2) and (2.3) rearranged):
prp
′
rx
axb(2Rr −Db −Da) + xb(1− xa)pr(Rr −Db) + xa(1− xb)pr(Rr −Da)
> xapr(Rr −Da) (Risky borrowers)
psp
′
sx
axb(2Rs −Db −Da) + xb(1− xa)ps(Rs −Db) + xa(1− xb)ps(Rs −Da)
> xbps(Rs −Db) (Safe borrowers)
Therefore, we consider the equilibrium contracts described in the previous
section and we check whether they satisfy the conditions above. We show that
when p′i is relatively low, the constraints are both satisfied. Intuitively, this is
due to the fact that borrowers recognize that in case of failure, they will have
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to repay two loans rather than one and enjoy no rent even in case of partial
failure. In that respect, taking a second loan actually decreases the chances to
enjoy some rent since the income from one project might be lost to repay the
other. In the following propositions we state formally the conditions under
which multiple borrowing does not take place. We start by considering the
screening equilibria.
Proposition 7. When two profit maximizing MFIs compete, in the screening
equilibria there are no ex-ante incentives for multiple-borrowing if p′r < pˆ
′
r,
where
pˆ′r :=
(1− β)(m− 1)−ΠaResB
(1− β)(2m− prRs − 1)−ΠaResB
< 1.
Proof. See Appendix 2.5
The proposition above shows that screening equilibria are robust to the
specific type of incomplete information we are considering when the probabil-
ity of succeeding in the second project is low enough. Note that no conditions
are required on p′s since the Safe borrowers incentive constraint is not bind-
ing. The implication of this result is that, if the contracts are properly defined,
multiple lending is ex-ante not a problem whenever the market is risky enough.
The assumption that borrowers repay as much as they can plays a crucial
role. This highlight the fact that the very frequent installments characterizing
micro-loans’ repayment schedules are one of the fundamental ingredients that
allowed for the success of microfinance. As other researchers pointed out, this
seems to be more relevant than group lending to explain the impressively low
default rates of poor borrowers. Our result identify a different reason why
frequent installments can be of fundamental importance for an MFI operating
in a competitive market.
As noticed in the previous section, screening is not the only possible out-
come of the competitive interaction between MFIs. We showed that, for some
values of the parameters, pooling equilibria can prevail. The result of Propo-
sition 7 extends to these cases in a very similar way: when MFIs offer identical
contracts, there are no incentives for ex-ante multiple borrowing as long as
the market is risky enough. The result is formalized in the next proposition.
Proposition 8. When two profit maximizing MFIs compete, in the pooling
equilibria there are no ex-ante incentives for multiple borrowing if p′s < 1/2.
Proof. See Appendix 2.5
It is interesting to compare the results of propositions 7 and 8 to under-
stand the circumstances in which multiple borrowing is more likely to take
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place. The relative performance of screening equilibria versus no-screening
ones is unfortunately ambiguous in some cases. Clearly, when pˆ′r > 1/2 then
screening makes multiple lending unambiguously less likely. By using the
definition of pˆ′r we can note that
pˆ′r > 1/2 ⇔ (1− αa)(1 − β)(prRs − 1) > αaβ(m− prRs).
If αa > 1/2, then the condition is satisfied when the fraction (1− β) of risky
borrowers is high and/or when the difference between the safe and the risky
borrowers is relatively small in terms of return and probability of success (so
that (prRs − 1) is close to (m − 1)). If αa < 1/2, then the condition is more
easily satisfied. Since by assumption αa ≥ αb, this means that screening is
particularly useful and likely to take place when the market is still largely
unserved and the fraction of Risky borrowers is high. Both hypothesis fit very
well the typical microcredit market. When pˆ′r < 1/2, no clear comparison is
possible.
A different way to put it is to say that if pˆ′r > 1/2 and p
′
r ∈ [1/2, pˆ′r], than
screening can become a way to solve the problem of ex-ante multiple borrow-
ing. In this case, in fact, with a non-screening strategy multiple borrowing is
unavoidable. Screening, instead allows to eliminate the incentives for all the
borrowers to take more than one loan. Note, moreover, that screening is in
this case much easier to sustain in equilibrium since the profit from all the
outside options, for both MFI a and b is importantly reduced.14
In any case, since p′s > p
′
r, whenever the Safe types have incentives to
multiple borrow also the Risky ones have, the results above have an important
implication summarized in the next corollary.
Corollary 1. In both screening and pooling equilibria, MFIs do not want to
multi-lend.
Intuitively, MFIs might have incentives to multi-lend to safe borrowers
when p′s > pr > p
′
r. Our results show that even in this case, MFIs prefer to
avoid it.
14If a non-screening strategy leads to multiple borrowing, whereas a screening one avoids
it, the type of equilibria described in Proposition 5 are easier to attain. A more formal
characterization would require to re-calculate the thresholds described above. But in order
to do it is necessary to model the behavior of borrowers when only partial reimbursement is
possible. As discussed above, they could give priority to one MFI rather than the other (be-
cause of different enforcement power, dynamic incentives etc.). Modelling all this explicitly
is interesting for other purposes, but qualitatively would not add anything to our discussion.
We believe our results are able to describe the mechanics and the forces leading to multiple
borrowing without making arbitrary assumptions.
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2.4 Conclusions
Microfinance has attracted an important variety of actors, pursuing different
objectives and competing with each other to attract clients. Our model de-
scribes the interaction between these actors in a tractable framework capturing
the special features of microcredit markets.
Our contribution is to show that even if increasing competition can make
informational asymmetries harsher, proper contract design can help mitigat-
ing some of the consequent negative effects. We concentrate on the ex-ante
incentive to multiple-borrow in order to evaluate the effects of the absence
of a credit bureau. Understanding the mechanism driving our results is very
important for those who are working to enlarge the outreach and promote the
development of microfinance.
Our model does not tackle all the issues created by insufficient information
sharing between MFIs. In particular, using a static model, we concentrate only
on the ex-ante incentives to multiple borrow. A dynamic set-up would allow
to address the ex-post incentives arising from unpredicted negative shocks.
Thus, our result should not be read as aiming at understating the importance
of a credit bureau. Our emphasis is rather on how MFIs can minimize their
risk when information sharing is impossible. We believe this is an interest-
ing approach since in many developing countries the conditions making the
creation of a credit bureau possible are still far from being fulfilled.
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2.5 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 5: Suppose that i is willing to serve the Safe borrowers only,
and that she offers the contract described in Lemma 5. We show that j’s optimal
reaction is to offer a screening contract. We start by computing the profits j would
get serving the Risky borrowers only, that is when Bj(Ci, Cj) = (1−β). In this case,
her maximization problem is given by:
max
xj ,Dj
Πjrs = (1 − β)xj(prDj − 1)
In order to have Bj(Ci, Cj) = 1− β, we need the following conditions to hold.
Dj ≤ Rr PC1
Di ≤ Rs PC2
xjpr(Rr −Dj) ≥ xipr(Rr −Di) IC1
xips(Rs −Di) ≥ xjps(Rs −Dj) IC2
Consider first the constraints PC1 and IC1. The IC1 is always binding since the left
hand side is decreasing in Dj . Solving it for Dj we get:
Dj = Rr − x
i
xj
(Rr −Di)
What about xj? Substituting Dj in the profit function we get:
Πjrs = (1− β)xj [prRr − pr
xi
xj
(Rr −Di)− 1] = (1− β)(xrprRr − xj − prxi(Rr −Di))
that is clearly maximized for xj = 1 given that prRr = m > 1. So j can set:{
xj = 1
Dj = Rr − xixj (Rr −Di)
(2.8)
that gives her the expected profit:
Πjrs = (1− β)[(m− 1)− prxi(Rr −Di)] (2.9)
This profit must be compared with j’s outside options. She can:
1. Target the Risky sector, but serve only the residual demand of the Risky.
It is then optimal to set Dj = Rr and x
j = 1, that gives profit ΠResR =
αj(1− β)(m− 1).
2. Target the residual demand of Both types. This leads to profit ΠResB =
αj [β(m− 1) + (1− β)(prRs − 1)].
3. Target both types undercutting the Incumbent’s contract. This can be done
by setting xj = 1 and Dj = Di. The profit is then the same as in point 2:
ΠBoth = α
j [β(m− 1) + (1− β)(prRs − 1)].
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The equality between ΠResB and ΠResR is due to the assumption α
i + αj < 1.
Depending on the parameters and on the assumptions about MFIs’ behavior, one
of the remaining options dominates the other. When ΠjResR ≥ ΠjResB we need this
condition to hold for j to engage in screening:
(1− β)[(m− 1)− prxi(Rr −Di)] > αj(1− β)(m − 1) (2.10)
Solving the inequality for xi we find the threshold:
xˆ(Di) :=
(1− αj)(m− 1)
m− prDi (2.11)
When ΠjResB ≥ ΠjResR, the following condition is needed:
(1− β)[(m − 1)− prxi(Rr −Di)] > αj [β(m− 1) + (1− β)(prRs − 1)] (2.12)
and solving for xi we get:
xˆ(Di) :=
(1− β)(m− 1)− αj [β(m− 1) + (1 − β)(prRs − 1)]
(1− β)pr(Rr −Di) (2.13)
Note that in all these cases xˆ(Di) is not necessarily in [0, 1). If xˆ(Di) is greater than
one, then screening is clearly possible for any xi < 1.
We still have to show that these values of xˆ(Di) make screening possible. We have to
verify that given j’s optimal reaction, the value xˆ(Di) satisfies also condition (IC2).
Replacing xj = 1 and Dj = Rr − xixj (Rr −Di) in the IC2 we get:
xi(Rs −Di) ≥ [Rs −Rr + xi(Rr −Di)]⇒ xi(Rs −Rr) ≥ Rs −Rr
that is satisfied for any xi ∈ [0, 1).
Proof of Lemma 6: Suppose that i wants to specialize in the Risky sector inducing
j to serve the Safe sector and offer an incentive compatible contract. In this case j
solves this maximization problem:
max
xj ,Dj
Πjsr = βx
j(psD
j − 1)
To have Bj(Ci, Cj) = β, the following conditions must be fulfilled:
Dj ≤ Rs PC1
Di ≤ Rr PC2
xipr(Rr −Di) ≥ xjpr(Rr −Dj) IC1
xjps(Rs −Dj) ≥ xips(Rs −Di) IC2
Note first that i sets Di ≥ Rs. We show that, as long as Di > Rs, i can raise j’s
profit from screening by setting a lower Di. Consider first the IC2. When Di ≥ Rs
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the RHS is negative, and the PC binds. Thus j can set Dj = Rs. In order to attain
screening, IC1 must be satisfied. Solving it for xj we find the condition:
xj ≤ x
i(Rr −Di)
Rr −Dj (2.14)
that is binding at the optimum. Notice that if Di = Rr, (2.14) is true only for x
j = 0.
So i must offer a contract with Di < Rr. j’s expected profit is then:
Πjsr = βxˆ(m− 1) (2.15)
This must be compared with j’s outside options. She can:
1. Target both types offering a non incentive compatible contract characterized
by Dj = Rs and x
j = 1. This strategy gives profit Πjbr = α
j(β(m − 1) + (1 −
β)(prRs − 1)). In this case, for j to prefer serving the Safe types, we need
Πjsr ≥ Πjbr . In formulas:
βxj(m−1) ≥ αj(β(m−1)+(1−β)(prRs−1)) =⇒ xj ≥ αj(1+(1− β)(prRs − 1)
β(m− 1) )
Replacing xj with (2.14) we get:
Di ≤ Rr − α
j
xi
[
1 +
(1 − β)(prRs − 1)
β(m− 1)
]
(Rr −Rs) := D˜i
2. Target the Risky sector, undercutting i: also in this case, as showed above, to
induce screening i must set Di = Rr − xj/xi(Rr −Rs). We can determine the
relevant value of xj by solving the inequality :
βxj(m− 1) ≥ (1 − β)[(m− 1)− prxj(Rr −Rs)] =⇒
xj ≥ (1− β)(m − 1)
β(m− 1) + (1− β)(m− prRs) .
Now replacing again xj with (2.14) we get:
Di ≤ Rr − 1
xi
[ (1 − β)(m− 1)
β(m− 1) + (1− β)(m − prRs)
]
(Rr −Rs) := D˜i
If we define
x˜j := max
{
αj(1 +
(1− β)(prRs − 1)
β(m− 1) ),
(1− β)(m− 1)
β(m− 1) + (1− β)(m− prRs)
}
then D˜i(x˜j) gives the upper bound for Di.
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Proof of Proposition 5: The proof hinges on Lemma 5 and Lemma 6. Suppose
that MFI i, with i ∈ {a, b} has offered an incentive compatible contract targeting the
Safe borrowers, that is a contract such that Di ≤ Rs and xi < 1. Assume also that
αj ≥ 1 − β, with j 6= i, j ∈ {a, b}. Then MFI j’s reaction is to offer an incentive
compatible contract, too (that is a contract characterised by Dj = Rr − xi(Rr −Di)
and xj = 1) if the profit from screening is higher than the best possible outside
option. MFI j’s profit from serving the Risky types in a screening set-up is given by
Πjr(C
i) = (1− β)[(m − 1)− xi(m− prDi)]
The best outside option for j, given i’s contract, is to undercut it offering Dj = Di
and xj = 1. That would give her ΠjBoth(C
i) = αj(β(psD
i − 1) + (1− β)(prDi − 1)).
Thus the condition for MFI j to prefer screening is: Πjr(C
i) > ΠjBoth(C
i). As showed
in Lemma 1 and 2, MFI i optimally sets Di = Rs. Thus, the condition above can be
rewritten as:
xi ≤ (1− β)(m− 1)− α
j [β(m− 1) + (1− β)(prRs − 1)]
(1− β)(m − prRs) (2.16)
In order for the strategies defined above to be an equilibrium, we need MFI i to
prefer setting xi smaller than the upper bound above rather than playing her outside
options. Several alternatives are available to i. Assume first that αi > β. There are
then two cases:
(i) The best outside option is to serve both types setting Di = Rs and x
i = 1. In
this case for i to prefer a screening strategy we need this condition to hold:
xi ≥ α
i[β(m− 1) + (1− β)(prRs − 1)]
β(m− 1) := x˜
i (2.17)
(ii) The best outside option is to undercut MFI j’s contract. We have to distinguish
two sub-cases. If αi ≥ (1− β) the screening condition is:
xi ≥ (1 − β)(m− 1)
β(m− 1) + (1 − β)(m− prRs) := x˜
i (2.18)
If instead αi < (1− β) the condition is:
βxi(m− 1) ≥ αi(1 − β)[(m− 1)− xi(m− prRs))
that can be rewritten as:
xi ≥ α
i(1− β)(m − 1)
β(m− 1) + αi(1− β)(m− prRs) := x˜
i (2.19)
To have an equilibrium, equation (2.16) and one of the three equations defining x˜i
((2.17), (2.18), (2.19)) must be satisfied simultaneously.
Consider now the case in which αi < β. It easy to see that in this case equilibria
similar to the one described above are still possible. If αi > x˜i than the results showed
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above hold true. If the capacity is instead very small, then the level of screening is
implicitly defined by αi. To see that, just observe that when αi < x˜is and D
i ≤ Rs
the outside option examined at point (i) can be ruled out. In fact, j can impose
a screening strategy just by giving the Risky borrowers the adequate informational
rent.
Proof of Proposition 6: Suppose first that ΠResR > ΠResB , and that MFI a offers
a contract with xa = 1 and Da = D∗(b). We describe the optimal reaction of b. Given
a’s capacity constraint, the residual demand is given by 1 − αa, but by assumption
αb ≤ (1−αa). So b cannot do better than offering D∗(b). In fact, by definition D∗(b)
satisfies this condition:
αb[β(psD
∗(b)− 1) + (1− β)(prD∗(b)− 1)] = αb(1− β)(m − 1)
that can be rewritten as β(psD
∗(b) − 1) + (1 − β)(prD∗(b) − 1) = (1 − β)(m − 1).
We now show that offering xa = 1 and Da = D∗(b) is a best reaction for a given b’s
contract. For a not to be willing to undercut b’s contract, D∗(b) must satisfy this
condition:
αa[β(psD
∗(b)− 1) + (1− β)(prD∗(b)− 1)] = αa(1 − β)(m− 1),
since αa ≤ (1 − αb). The condition is clearly satisfied. So a’s best reply, given our
tie-breaking rule, is also to offer xa = 1 and Da = D∗(b). Analogous reasoning can
be used for the case in which ΠResR(α
b) < ΠResB(α
b).
Proof of Proposition 7: Assume that MFI b serves the Safe borrowers and MFI
a serves the Risky ones. In the equilibria with screening of the simultaneous model
b sets xb = xˆs < 1 and D
b = Rs, whereas a sets x
a = 1 and Da = Dˆr, where xˆs and
Dˆr are defined as in Lemma 5.
When we substitute these values in equations (2.2) and (2.3), we get the following
conditions:
(Rr −Rs)p′r < (Rr − Dˆr)(1 − p′r)
for the Risky not to multiple-borrow, and
(Rs − Dˆr)(p′sxb + 1− xb) < xb(Rs −Rs)(1 − p′s) = 0
for the Safe not to multiple borrow. The second condition is always satisfied since
Dˆr > Rs. The first condition is satisfied for
p′r <
Rr − Dˆr
2Rr −Rs − Dˆr
=
(1 − β)(m− 1)− αa[prRs − 1 + β(m− prRs)]
(1 − β)(2m− prRs − 1)− αa[prRs − 1 + β(m− prRs)]
Note that the threshold is well defined since it always belong to the interval [0, 1].
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Proof of Proposition 8. The result follows immediately from Proposition 6 and
equations (2.2) and (2.3) by replacing Da = Db = D∗ and xa = xb = 1.
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Chapter 3
Cooperative versus
Third-Party Provision of
Financial Infrastructure
Services
(With Joachim Keller, National Bank of Belgium)
Abstract: We analyze the effects of competitive interaction between dif-
ferently owned financial providers on the level of safety enhancing investments
and market configuration. In our model, agents need an input service for the
financial market they operate in. They can decide whether to provide it them-
selves by forming a Cooperative or outsource it from a Third Party Provider.
We prove that the co-existence of differently governed infrastructures leads to
a significant reduction in the investment in safety. In most cases, monopo-
listic provision is preferable to competition. Moreover, the decision rule used
within the Cooperative plays a central role in determining the optimal market
configuration.
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3.1 Introduction
The efficient and reliable functioning of financial infrastructures, such as pay-
ment and settlement systems, clearing houses, exchanges and financial mes-
saging services, has received considerable attention by policymakers in recent
years. Traditionally, these infrastructures have been owned and managed in
a cooperative fashion by their users. Now this trend seems to be changing.
We build on this observation and focus on two main issues. The first is the
emergence of competition in the provision of financial services. The second
relates to the identity of the new players: there are more and more non-bank
providers, characterized by non-mutual organizational forms (Weiner, Brad-
ford, Hayashi, Sullivan, Wang, and Rosati (2007)). Our goal is to shed some
light on how competition and different ownership regimes affect the reliability
of service provision.
The specific type of service provision we analyze is characterized by large
scale economies and network effects. Thus, the initial concern is whether
competition or, in general, the presence of more than a single provider is
desirable at all. There is, in fact, a tension between exploiting economies of
scale - which would favor a monopoly provision - and the desire of users to
choose among their preferred services.
In terms of governance, it is not clear whether services are better provi-
sioned by bank owned and governed infrastructures or by third-party providers,
owned by third-party investors. There is a widespread belief that third-party
owned providers have fewer incentives to invest in quality and reliability than
user-owned providers, as the former are solely concerned with profit max-
imization while the latter internalize the impact of inadequate quality and
resilience.
We focus on a scenario in which both a bank-owned cooperative and a
third-party owned infrastructure can provide a service to banks. In this simple
setting, we try to answer the following questions: under which circumstances
do infrastructures coexist and when is monopolistic provision the only viable
form? How does the competition of a private provider affect the investment
in quality and reliability? How efficient are the different organizational forms
with respect to quality? Is the market outcome in line with social welfare (or
with the interest of a policymaker such as a central bank), or is there room
for intervention?
In order to answer these questions, we take as given the presence of a coop-
erative (bank-owned and -governed) provider and a private, third-party owned
provider. Both providers must decide on the appropriate level of investment
in quality of the infrastructure. This investment represent a fixed cost and
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hence exhibits scale economies. Users differ in their valuation for quality of
the service and can choose between the providers (i.e. being member of the
cooperative or sourcing the service from the private provider). From the view-
point of users/banks, cooperative provision has a fundamental advantage in
the provision of the service, as it allows them to retain all rents from running
the service, while the private provider must be compensated for providing it.
This, and the presence of scale economies, would normally favor monopolistic
provision of the service by a cooperative. However, the heterogeneity of users
and their desire to receive tailored service gives an opportunity to a second
provider. Moreover, in equilibrium, coordination failures of banks may lead
to potentially inefficient market configurations.
We show that the ownership regime can affect both the investment de-
cisions and the market structure. We are able to disentangle two different
sources of inefficiencies. The first arises from heterogeneity of users and leads
to inefficient duplication of the infrastracture. The second is a direct conse-
quence of the governance and leads to under-investment.
Our results show that private provision is possible only when a large num-
ber of users are willing to purchase the service from a private provider, or when
the level of heterogeneity is particularly high. Moreover, coexistence of two
infrastructures has always negative consequences on the level of investment.
This is due only in part to the wasteful duplication of the investment and the
loss of scale economies. A fundamental role is played by the differences in
the ownership structure: the higher is the quality offered by the cooperative,
the lower are the incentives for a private provider to invest in risk reducing
measures.
These findings suggest that the decision rule used inside the cooperatives
can have a relevant impact on the whole market structure. In this respect, the
role of the regulator (like a central bank), can be crucial. Although the tools
available to regulators to control decision making rules within cooperatives
are somewhat limited, evidence shows that through moral suasion regulators
can obtain important results. Our model provides some interesting hints on
when this type of ‘soft’ intervention can be useful.
The paper relates to several strands of the literature. First, it is linked to
the literature contrasting the performance of cooperatives and investor-owned
profit maximizing firms. Hart and Moore (1996) compare the efficiency of
investment decisions of a cooperative and an investor-owned for-profit monop-
olist. They show that both forms of ownership are plagued by inefficiencies
and that the relative advantage of one form over the other depends on the
degree of heterogeneity of users. Hart and Moore (1996) do not model the
competitive interaction between the two types but simply compare the out-
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comes of two scenarios where a provider of either form has a monopoly power.
Our model, in contrast, addresses the question of actual market outcome and
the interaction between platforms. Hart and Moore’s (1996) results rely on
the median-voter theorem and the in-ability of users to make side-payments.
Rey and Tirole (2007) focus on the inability of cooperatives to commit to long
term investments. In their model, users may free-ride on investments of other
users. This leads to inefficient investment behavior (dynamic investment prob-
lem). The authors discuss access policies to mitigate this problem and show
that cooperatives may be in a weak position when competing with a for-profit
firm. We share the focus on the competitive interaction between cooperatives
and for-profit firms, but assume that users, once they have decided to form a
cooperative, can efficiently make investments.
Second, our paper relates to the literature on the desirability of compe-
tition in the presence of network externalities. This literature investigates
the relative performance of competition versus monopoly in terms of social
desirability. The main trade-off is between the exploitation of scale economies
(favoring monopoly provision) and the desire for differentiated services (fa-
voring competitive provision). For example, Argenziano (2008) considers a
duopoly of differentiated networks. The aggregate network surplus is maxi-
mized when all users join the same network, while the intrinsic utility of users
is maximized when they can join the network they prefer. The social optimum
is characterized by an asymmetric distribution of users towards the network
where the high quality users are in larger number. The authors show that the
market outcome is characterized by insufficient asymmetry, i.e. the market
shares of the networks are too balanced. The reasons are the inability of users
to internalize scale economies and the too high prices set by the high quality
network (diminishing its market share).
Similary, Economides and Siow (1988) analyze a model of spatial com-
petition where market participants value liquidity, i.e. the presence of other
participants in a market place. Ultimately, market participants must trade-
off their preference for localized markets against the greater liquidity of fewer
markets. Di Noia (1998) considers competition and integration among Eu-
ropean stock exchanges. Exchanges may merge ‘implicitly’ with each other
by allowing trades of each other listed companies. Such mergers increase
efficiency since they allow exploitation of scale economies. Absent such merg-
ers, competition may drive the industry towards concentration to a single
monopoly exchange reaping full economies of scale. Hence, consolidation (or
monopolistic provision) is the most desirable case (See also Tapking and Yang
(2006))
Cantillony and Yin (2008) study the empirical determinants of member-
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ship to competing exchanges. They find evidence in favor of an important
role played by users’ heterogeneity. They show that vertical differentiation,
as measured by the liquidity level, is one of the key factor explaining users’
choices. Also in our model heterogeneity influences the strategic choices of the
service providers, but our focus is exclusively on the level of reliability of the
provision. Our approach aims at singling out potential areas of intervention
of a regulator.
The literature has also highlighted several shortcomings of cooperatively
managed firms (dynamic investment problems as in Rey and Tirole (2007),
ineffective decision making as in Hart and Moore (1996), coordination failures
etc.). In our model we do not impose any a priori handicap on the Co-
operative in order to catch directly the effects of network externalities, user
heterogeneity and coordination.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we
introduce the model. In Section 3.3 we describe the investment decision of
the cooperative and of the Private Provider. In Section 3.4 we show and
characterize the existence of quasi-pooling and pooling equilibria. In Section
3.5 we analyze the separating equilibria. Finally, in Section 3.7 we conclude.
3.2 The Model
Consider a continuum of agents (users) who require a specific input service
in order to sell downstream a product to their customers. For instance, users
can be banks, and the input services can be clearing and settlement services,
financial messaging or payment systems which banks use for their services to
customers.
We concentrate on the provision of the input service. Specifically, we focus
on the investment in quality of this service. We assume that the benefit users
derive from selling their products downstream is exogenously given. However,
the quality of the input service determines the expected profits that users
derive from their activity.
The quality of the input service can be interpreted in several ways. For
instance, it can denote the probability that the service provision is successful.
A lower quality may force a bank to execute manual check-ups or keep internal
back-up systems, reducing downstream profits. The investment in quality
exhibits economies of scale, and this creates incentives for users to jointly
provide (or purchase) the service. We also assume that the input service
resembles a commodity, in that the choice of the service provider has no
impact on the ability of banks to differentiate downstream.
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The input service can be provided by a cooperative or by a third-party
owned profit-maximizing firm. We label the former as Cooperative and the
latter as Third Party Provider (TPP). We analyze a setting in which one Co-
operative and one TPP are in place. Thus, we rule out the emergence of a
second Cooperative or the entry of an additional TPP. This is a reasonable
simplifying assumption, since there are substantial entry barriers for both
types of organizations. These barriers, such as high fixed costs or dynamic
investment problem (see Rey and Tirole (2007)), are likely to make it difficult
for users to form a second cooperative. Obviously, for similar reasons, also a
third party providers may find entry too costly. However, a private provider
that is already active in adjacent markets (think of a firm offering telecom-
munication networks entering the market for financial messaging or payment
services) may have lower fixed costs and easier access to the market. This
simple set-up allows to describe the effects of different ownership regimes and
the interaction between a Cooperative and a TPP in the easiest possible way.
Users. The market is characterized by a unit measure of users (banks) with
inelastic demand for the input service provided by the financial infrastructure.
Let ∆ be the users’ downstream benefit and let γ ∈ [0, 1] be a measure of the
quality of the input service. Then, the expected profits enjoyed by users
equal γ∆. Users differ in the benefit they earn from providing the service
downstream. Let α be the share of users earning high benefit ∆H , and (1−α)
the share of users earning ∆L, with ∆H > ∆L. Denote the average benefit
by ∆¯ = α∆H + (1− α)∆L. For each infrastructure, the proportion of H and
L users is not necessarily the same as in the whole market. Let then hc be
the proportion of H type users joining the Cooperative, and let hp be the
proportion of H type users buying the input service from the TPP. Clearly,
α = hc + hp. Similarly, let lc be the proportion of L type users joining the
Cooperative, and lp be the proportion of H type users buying the input service
from the TPP. Finally, let λ = hc + lc denote the fraction of users staying in
the Cooperative and 1−λ the measure of users buying the input service from
the TPP.
Infrastructures: Infrastructures determine the level of quality of the ser-
vice, γ, through a non verifiable investment whose cost is measured by c2γ
2.
We interpret quality as the probability of successful provision of the service.
In other words, γ can be seen as a measure of reliability. We assume that an
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infrastructure is not viable for a single user1. We model the investment costs
as being independent of the number of users. Hence, a larger number of users
can exploit larger economies of scale. As outlined above, infrastructures can
have two different ownership regimes: cooperative or third-party ownership.
In our model, a different ownership regime corresponds to a different form of
governance. The regimes we consider differ in several ways:
• Cooperative provision: In a cooperative, users have control over the
investment in the quality of the service. This investment has a cost
that we assume to be shared equally between users. We imagine the
cooperative as being based on a contract stating a decision rule to use
for the investment decision. In general, such a rule can value more the
opinion of one category of users - for instance theH type users - or can be
based on a purely majoritarian principle - in this case H users’ opinion
matters only if hc >
1
2 . In the next section, we analyze in detail two
different rules: the average rule, according to which investment is made
according to the average user’s taste, and the median rule, according
to which the median user’s preferences matter. It is well known that
majority decision rules may fail to maximize users’ total utility when
the level of heterogeneity is high and users’ preferences are skewed (see
Hart and Moore (1996)). The implicit assumption behind this result is
that the Coase theorem does not hold. Average decision rule maximizes
the total value of the cooperative. This represent the case where users
can make transfer among themselves to maximize total users utility (the
Coase theorem holds).
In the first part of the paper we consider the decision rule to be exoge-
neously given. In other words, we do not allow the cooperative members
to choose strategically their rule in order to better face competition from
a private provider. Later, we relax this assumption by allowing users to
select their preferred decision rule. By doing that, they can discourage
the simultaneous defection of a group.
• Third-Party Provision: Under this form of provision, users cannot con-
trol directly the investment in quality. They sign a contract with the
TTP designed to create credible incentives to invest. The contract stip-
ulates a sharing rule s ∈ [0, 1] of the benefit enjoyed by users. The
transfer is paid ex-post, i.e. after the realization of γ, only in case of
1Since we have a continuum of users, this is equivalent to assuming that c is strictly
positive
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successful service provision2. The contingent transfer s and the invest-
ment γ are set up in such a way to maximize the TPP’s profit given the
users’ participation constraints.
Timeline: The timing of actions is the following:
t = 0: The TTP sets the share s;
t = 1: Users simultaneously decide which system to join (they can join one
system only);
t = 2: Given the mass of respective users and the value of s, the cooperative
and/or the private provider invest in risk-mitigating measures.
The model is solved by backward induction and the solution is a subgame
perfect equilibrium.
3.3 Investment Decisions
We start by analyzing the last stage of the game: we describe how the Coop-
erative and the TPP take their investment decisions. They both choose their
optimal level of investment by taking as given the fraction λ of users belonging
to the cooperative. We show that, through this mechanism, the cooperative
decision rule has an important influence on the private provider’s investment
and, ultimately, on the market configuration.
3.3.1 Cooperative Provision
Accessing the financial service allows users to enjoy the profit γ∆. Cooper-
ative members have to pay a fraction of the total investment cost c2γ
2. We
assume that the cost is equally shared between them. This assumption is
justified by the fact that the service we are considering has a unique quality
dimension (for instance, its reliability), so that it is not possible to offer dif-
ferentiated contracts inducing self-selection of users. Moreover, assuming cost
2Note that, since the investment in quality is unique, the only screening device available
to the private provider to discriminate between high and low valuation users is to price high
enough to exclude low types. But there it is impossible to serve low types only. In fact,
both types have inelastic demand and the provider knows the distribution of high and low
valuation users but not the identity of a single individual. Thus, he can only set one sharing
rule based on the average type.
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sharing proportional to the valuation of users would not qualitatively change
our results.
The members of the Cooperative agree by contract on a decision rule. We
consider two decision rules that we consider prominent for their theoretical
and empirical relevance:
• Decision rule that maximizes utility of the average user;
• Decision rule that maximizes utility of the median user;
The first rule yields the best outcome, in terms of overall user utility, when
preferences are skewed. For this reason, it provides an important benchmark.
The second one is the standard majority rule. It allows for a realistic repre-
sentation of the cooperatives in which users take decisions by voting, but is
known to provide inefficient outcomes when the preferences are skewed.3
Average decision rule: When the cooperative decides according to the
average user’s taste, it maximizes the following objective function:
Wc(λ, ∆¯c) := λγ∆¯c − c
2
γ2
where ∆¯c =
hc∆H+lc∆L
λ
. This is the total utility generated by the cooperative.
The maximization yields to the investment:
γA =
λ∆¯c
c
(3.1)
The resulting per user utility is given by:
U ic(∆¯c) =
λ
c
(∆i∆¯c − ∆¯
2
c
2
) (3.2)
with i = H,L.
3As shown in the following sections, the decision rule can have important consequences
in terms of equilibrium outcomes. It would be therefore interesting to discuss the optimal
decision rule that a regulator would like to see implemented. It is not clear, though, whether
a regulator like a central bank (or any other authority) has the power of enforcing any such
decision rule. In our view, a regulator central bank can only influence the decision making
through soft instruments as moral suasion.
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Median decision rule. We now consider the case in which the cooperative
chooses the investment according to the preferences of the median voter. First,
let the median voter be a high valuation user. The cooperative maximizes the
total utility:
Wc(λ,∆H) := λγ∆H − c
2
γ2
that yields to the following investment:
γM =
λ∆H
c
(3.3)
The resulting utility functions for high and low valuation users are described
by the following formulas:
UHc (∆H) =
λ
c
∆2H
2
(3.4)
ULc (∆H) =
λ
c
(∆L∆H − ∆
2
H
2
)
Consider now the case in which the median voter is a low valuation user. Then
the cooperative maximizes
Wc(λ,∆L) := λγ∆L − c
2
γ2
and chooses this level of investment:
γm =
λ∆L
c
(3.5)
The resulting utility functions for high and low valuation users are given by:
UHc (∆L) =
λ
c
(∆L∆H − ∆
2
L
2
) (3.6)
ULc (∆L) =
λ
c
∆2L
2
3.3.2 Private Service Provision
Since the Third Party Provider does not know the identity of the potential
users, we assume that in deciding the optimal s, she takes into account the
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average benefit that users get from accessing the financial service. In other
words, all users are asked in equilibrium to make the same transfer s∆¯.4
At time t = 2, for every given s and λ, the TPP’s maximizes the following
profit function:
max
γ
Πp := (1− λ)s∆¯pγ − c
2
γ2 (3.7)
where ∆¯p :=
hp∆H+lp∆L
1−λ . Solving the FOC with respect to γ yields:
γp(s, λ) = (1− λ)s∆¯
c
(3.8)
Thus, the user utility from purchasing the service from a private provider is
given by:
U ip(s) = γp(s)(∆i − s∆¯) = (1− λ)s
∆¯
c
(∆i − s∆¯) (3.9)
for i = H,L. Note that U ip(s) is maximized at s = ∆i/2∆¯.
3.4 Pooling and Quasi-Pooling Equilibria
In the previous section we described how users’ utility from belonging to the
Cooperative (i.e. their outside option) depends also on the decision rule used
within it. In what follows, we analyze the behavior of users at time t = 1 and
the way the TTP sets s at time t = 0. We show the existence of different types
of equilibria. We start by considering quasi-pooling equilibria, i.e. equilibria in
which two infrastructures compete, and each serves a fraction of both types of
users. We then analyze pooling equilibria. The separating ones are considered
in Section 3.5.
The situation in which both providers serve a fraction of both types of
users is empirically relevant since many financial infrastructure (think of Visa
or American Express for the payment systems), are indeed characterized by
a heterogeneous population of users. Banks accessing Swift, for instance,
have significantly different size, and that has obvious consequences in terms
of demand for quality and reliability. Still, they prefer to be part of the same
infrastructure. In the previous section we described the Third Party Provider
maximization problem as a function of λ. Consider now the users’ subgame
(t = 1). We need to determine the number of users that, in equilibrium,
4This is without loss of generality, since s varies to compensate the change in ∆¯. An
equivalent formulation would be to define a price p = s∆¯. Our approach has the advantage
of making clearer the role of heterogeneity in the pricing decision.
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decide to purchase the service from the TPP. Note that, in order to have an
equilibrium in this subgame, users of both types must be indifferent between
staying in the cooperative and purchasing from the TPP (for a given decision
of all other users). In other words, the following incentive constraints must
be simultaneously satisfied:
UHp (γp, s, λ) = U
H
c (γc, λ) ICH
ULp (γp, s, λ) = U
L
c (γc, λ) ICL
where γc = γA, γM , γm depending on whether the cooperative uses the average
rule, the median rule with α ≥ 1/2 or with α < 1/2 respectively. Thus, we
need to find the value of λ, say λ∗, such that users of both types are indifferent
between joining the Third Party Provider or staying in the Cooperative.
The value of λ∗ depends on s. So to describe the equilibrium of the
game we have to consider the first stage (t = 0), in which the TPP sets the
optimal value of s. Obviously, the TPP wants to set s as high as possible.
Note that U ip(s) (see equation (3.9)) is quadratic in s, first increasing and
then decreasing. Thus, given that users have the outside option to belong
to the cooperative, the value of s that maximizes the TPP’s profit is the
one making his clients indifferent between belonging to the cooperative and
purchasing from the TPP. As a consequence, the conditions determining the
equilibrium in the users’ subgame are the same defining the optimal s. The
next proposition characterize the quasi-pooling equilibria of the game when
the cooperative uses the median decision rule.
Proposition 9. Suppose the cooperative uses the median decision rule. Then
there exist a subgame perfect equilibrium in which the TPP and the Cooperative
coexist and invest the same amount γp(s
∗) = γc = ∆H/3c [γp(s∗) = γc =
∆L/3c], the TPP sets s
∗ = ∆H/2∆¯ [s∗ = ∆L/2∆¯] and a mass λ = 13 of users
stay in the cooperative, for any hc and lc such that hc + lc = 1/3 and hc > lc
[lc > hc].
Proof. See Appendix B
The result is due to the fact that the simultaneous satisfaction of both
incentive constraints imposes on the TPP the choice of a particular value of s.
It turns out that for s = ∆i/2∆¯, γ = ∆iλ/c, with i = L,H, is the investment
level that maximizes the TPP’s profit only when λ = 1/3.
Note that the optimal investment in γ depends positively on the number of
users of a given infrastructure. Users can, in fact, enjoy larger scale economies
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when they are more numerous. When the TPP competes with the cooperative,
she makes users indifferent between belonging to either system. When λ =
1/3, she optimally sets γ at exactly the same level as the cooperative. But
since only 13 of the users stay in the cooperative, it follows that the Private
Provider (who serves 23 of the users) under-invest with respect to what a
cooperative with the same number of users would do. From this point of
view, quasi-pooling equilibria turns out to be particularly wasteful. In the
next proposition we fully characterize this type of equilibrium.
In order to have two coexisting infrastructures, a large enough measure
of users must defect the cooperative and outsource the service from a private
provider. In other words, scale is fundamental for private provision to be
viable.
It is interesting to note that in equilibrium, since λ = 13 , if the cooperative
decides according to the valuation of the High users, then s∗ = ∆H/2∆¯. That
means that the H types attain their first best, whereas the L types pay more
than their optimal price. A similar result applies when Low evaluation users
rule. Thus, when the median voter rule is used, the private provider extracts a
proportionally higher rent from the less numerous user group. Moreover, the
private provider is constrained at the most disadvantageous scenario in terms
of network size. For coexistence equilibria to be possible, we need λ = 13 ,
where her share attains the minimum.
From the regulator’s point of view, coexistence equilibria are inefficient in
two respects. First, the cooperative does not fully exploit scale economies,
since there is a wasteful duplication of infrastructures. Second, the TPP
has intrinsically lower incentives to invest in safety reduction. This second
effect is exclusively due to the different ownership structure, that leads to the
exploitation of scale economies to extract higher rents rather than invest more
in safety enhancing measures. The economies of scale are in fact enjoyed by
the private provider who, by setting a level of investment lower than what the
size of the system would allow, makes positive profits. This is summarized in
the next proposition.
Proposition 10. Suppose the cooperative decides according to the median
rule. Then, in the coexistence equilibria, the private provider makes positive
profits. Moreover, profits are larger when hc > lc.
Proof. See Appendix B.
The result above highlights the importance of the decision rule used by
the cooperative. When hc > lc, i.e. when a High users’ evaluation determines
the levels of investment within the cooperative, the private provider’s profits
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raise. Intuitively, when the cooperative, following H types’ desire, provide
high quality services, the Low users enjoy a lower utility. Thus, the Private
Provider can more easily attract them and extract a higher rent. As noted
above, at λ = 1/3, most of the profit is extracted from the low type users.
Thus, the lower is their relative utility, the higher is the Private Provider’s
profit. This has important consequences in terms of market composition: in
the presence of fixed entry costs, the use of the median user decision rule makes
the entry of a private provider more likely with respect to other decision rules.
The high type users of the cooperative face therefore a trade-off. On
the one hand, they prefer a decision rule giving them more importance. On
the other hand, such a decision rule might encourage the entry of a second
infrastructure, and that has negative consequences in terms of scale economies.
Which of the two effects dominates depends on the level of heterogeneity and
on the cost parameter c.
From the regulator’s point of view, the model suggests a similar trade-off.
A central banker, or any other type of regulator, would prefer a high level of
γ in order to ensure reliability of the transactions. Thus her incentives are
aligned to those of the high evaluation users. Proposition 10 shows that an
excessive effort of the regulator to impose higher level of investments, could
have perverse effects if it drives the markets toward a co-existence equilibrium.
We can now consider the situations in which the cooperative invests using
the average evaluation rule. In this case we have a negative results, that is
summarized in the next proposition.
Proposition 11. Suppose the cooperative decides according to the average
rule. Then there exist no quasi-pooling equilibria.
Proof. See Appendix B.
This result is due to the fact that when the cooperative uses the average
rule, any change in the distribution of high and low type users, modifies the
actual investment. With the median rule, this does not happen unless the
majority of users changes. The effect of this property is to allow the TPP
to modify, through the choice of s, the values of hc and lc in such a way to
maximize his profit. It turns out that the TPP’s profit would be maximized
when lc = 0, so that no quasi-pooling equilibria exist.
We now turn to consider the pooling equilibria. We show that there ex-
ists equilibria in which only one system operates in the market. The market
configurations in which either only the Third Party Provider or only the Co-
operative operates are both possible equilibria.
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Intuitively, when all users switch to the TPP (i.e. when λ = 0), the
utility of a single user belonging to the Cooperative is nil (see equation (3.4)).
Thus no user has individual incentive to abandon the TPP. It follows that
the market configuration in which the TPP operates as a monopolist is an
equilibrium.
In order to attract both types of users, the TPP sets s as high as to make
low valuation users (who enjoy a smaller utility for a given γ) indifferent
between staying in the Cooperative and defecting (that is s∗ = ∆L
∆¯
). At that
value the high valuation users enjoy a positive utility.
Following a similar reasoning, it can be shown that there also exists an
equilibrium in which only the Cooperative is in the market. For this equi-
librium to be possible, the level of heterogeneity needs to be relatively low
(∆L ≥ ∆(ω)2 ). This ensures that, for a given decision rule, the low valuation
users’ participation constraint is satisfied. These ideas are formalized in the
next proposition.
Proposition 12. The following market configurations are subgame perfect
equilibria:
• Private Monopoly: The Private Provider sets s∗ = ∆L
∆¯
and invests
γp(∆L) =
∆L
c
; λ = 0 and the Cooperative quits the market
• Cooperative Monopoly: The cooperative uses the median decision rule
[average decision rule], sets γc =
∆H
c
[γc =
∆¯c
c
]; ∆L ≥ ∆H2 , λ = 1 and
the Private Provider quits the market
Proof. See Appendix B
3.5 Separating Equilibria
So far we have only characterized equilibria in which users either pool in the
same monopolistic infrastructure (pooling equilibria), or split in two coexist-
ing ones but independently of their type (quasi-pooling equilibria). In the
co-existence equilibria examined so far, in fact, both infrastructures serve a
fraction of both types of users. We now analyze situations in which only users
of the same type pool in the same infrastructure, i.e. we prove the existence
of purely separating equilibria.
Each user has two strategies available: belonging to the cooperative (that
we label coop), and purchasing the service from the TPP (that we label tpp).
Let Ai = {coop, tpp}, with i = H,L, be the strategy set of type i, and let ai
denote an element of this set. Finally, let ULj (aH) denote the utility of type
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L users, belonging to infrastructure j, when the H types play aH . U
H
j (aL) is
similarly defined.
We prove the existence of two types of equilibria: in the first, high valua-
tion users stay in the cooperative while low valuation ones purchase form the
TPP; in the other one roles are inverted. In both cases, the value of α (i.e.
the proportion of H users in the market) and the level of heterogeneity (as
measured by ∆H − ∆L) play a crucial role. Users face a clear trade-off: in
order to better exploits economies of scale, they would prefer to pool in the
same infrastructure. However, the difference in their valuations tends to drive
them apart.
We start by characterizing the equilibrium in which H users stay in the
Cooperative and L users purchase from the TPP.
Proposition 13. A subgame perfect equilibrium in which H users stay in the
Cooperative and L users purchase from the TPP exists if one of the following
conditions is realized:
• ∆L ≤ ∆minL ≤ ∆H2 , where ∆minL :=
[
1
2 −
√
1−4α+3α2
2(1−α)
]
∆H . In this case
the TPP sets s∗ = 1 and invests γp = (1−α)∆Lc . The cooperative invests
γc = α
∆H
c
.
• ∆H2 ≤ ∆L ≤ ∆˜ and α ≥ 13 , where ∆˜ := α1−α
(
2−√2
√
3− 1
α
)
∆H . In
this case the TPP sets:
s∗ =
1
2
+
√
∆2L(1− α) + 2∆2Hα− 4∆H∆Lα
2∆L
√
1− α
γp =(1− α)s∗∆L
c
The cooperative sets γc = α
∆H
c
.
Proof. See Appendix.
Intuitively, when ∆L is low, L users prefer to stay on their own, since
joining H users would require a too large investment, possibly leading to
negative utility. From H users’ point of view, there are two countervailing
effects. On the one hand, joining the L users would grant cheap access to
the service: even when s∗ = 1 they would get a positive rent. On the other
hand, a lower transfer corresponds to a lower investment, and this drives the
H users’ incentives in the opposite direction. When ∆L is very low, the second
effect outweighs the first.
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Another way to understand the result above comes from the observation
that when the level of heterogeneity is particularly high, L users’ outside op-
tion (in this case switching to the cooperative) becomes less and less attractive.
Thus the TPP can exploit its market power by setting an higher s∗. This, in
turn, makes the deviation of H users less attractive.
When ∆L gets closer to ∆H , L users have higher incentives to join H users
in the cooperative. When the difference in valuation is very small (∆L ≥ ∆˜),
the cooperative becomes so attractive for the L users that the TPP cannot
find an s able to deter their defection. H users prefer the cooperative only
when scale economies (determined by their fraction α) are large enough.
Note that the threshold ∆˜ is well defined since it is equal to ∆H when
α = 1/3 and converges to ∆H2 as α goes to 1.
We now consider the opposite situation in which H users purchase from
the TPP and L users stay in the cooperative.
Proposition 14. A subgame perfect equilibrium in which L users stay in the
Cooperative and H users purchase from the TPP exists if either α ≥ 23 or
α ≤ 23 and ∆L ≤ ∆ˆL, where ∆ˆL =
(
1−
√
2
√
2−5α+3α2
(2(1−α)
)
∆H . In both cases the
TTP sets:
s∗ =
1
2
+
√
2∆2L(1− λ)− 4∆H∆L(1− λ) + ∆2Hλ
2∆H
√
λ
γp =αs
∗∆H
c
and the Cooperative sets γc = (1− α)∆Lc .
Proof. See Appendix.
When L users form a cooperative and H users purchase from the TPP,
L users never have incentives to switch. When the TPP sets s∗ very high
(s∗ ≥ ∆L∆H ), L users do not want to switch because paying such a transfer
would give them negative utility. But s∗ is low enough for L users to afford
it only when α is relatively small. This makes deviations less attractive to L
users, since the gain in terms of scale economies is small.
When scale economies are large (α ≥ 23), H users find it relatively unattrac-
tive to deviate to the cooperative. Thus the TPP can always find an s such
that H users do not want to deviate. When, instead, the mass of H users is
smaller, there are two different effects. On the one hand H users’ incentives to
deviate increase. On the other hand, a low α makes deviations less attractive
for L users. Thus the TPP can ask for a larger share s∗ and this reduces also
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the incentives for H users to deviate. When ∆L ≤ ∆ˆL, the second effect is
stronger than the first.
3.6 The Investment Level
It is now interesting to summarize the results presented so far in terms of
investment level. Our aim is to compare the performance of the providers in
the different market configurations. We start by comparing pooling and quasi-
pooling equilibria. Since, in this case, the cooperative and the TPP make
exactly the same investment in equilibrium, the comparison does not require
any additional assumption. Next proposition formalizes the main findings:
Proposition 15. The following statements hold true:
• Two coexisting infrastructures invest more than a monopolist TPP if the
cooperative uses the median rule, hc > lc and ∆L ≤ ∆H3 .
• Two coexisting infrastructures always invest less than a single coopera-
tive.
• The TPP always invest less than a Cooperative in the single infrastruc-
ture equilibria.
Proof. See Appendix
The result above suggests some interesting observations. First of all, the
coexistence equilibria are the least desirable from the central banker point of
view, with the only exception of the case in which ∆L ≤ ∆H3 . This condition
is satisfied when the level of heterogeneity is high and/or when the decision
rule used by the cooperative gives relatively more importance to High type
users. Note that this effect is not only due to the reduction of the positive
network externalities. In fact, as already pointed out above, in the coexistence
equilibria the TPP invest strictly less than a cooperative of the same size.
That means that the low level of investment can be imputed only in part
to the wasteful duplication of infrastructures: the ownership regime plays
an important role on his own. In fact the strategic behavior of the TPP,
in opposition to the myopic behavior of the Cooperative, leads to a further
reduction of the level of investment. In other words, even abstracting from
entry costs and scale economies, the competition between a cooperative and
a TPP can lead to a worsening of the infrastructure safety. This situation is
empirically very relevant since it mimics quite closely the competition between
Swift and BT Radianz in the market for messaging systems.
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Second, we know from Proposition 10 that the decision rule used inside the
cooperative influences positively the investment choice of the private provider:
when H users are the majority (and the median decision rule is used), the pri-
vate provider earns higher profits, and that in turns leads to higher investment.
But this effect is positive only as long as it does not lead to a co-existence
equilibrium. In this last case, lowering the level of investment would improve
the overall safety of service provision.
Lastly, when comparing the single infrastructure equilibria, the coopera-
tive fares better than the private provider. In fact, the presence of two different
user types and the impossibility to differentiate between them, renders to a
reduction of the level of investment. In the cooperative, the H types cross-
subsidize the L types in order to attain a higher level of investment. The
private provider, instead, under-invests in quality in order to attract both
types of users.
Consider now the separating equilibria. In the next proposition we com-
pare the investment levels of the cooperative and of the private provider.
Proposition 16. (i) Consider the equilibria in which H users stay in the
Cooperative and L users purchase from the TPP.
• Let ∆L ≤ ∆minL ≤ ∆H2 . Then γp ≤ γc if 1−αα ≤ ∆H∆L .
• Let ∆H2 ≤ ∆L ≤ ∆˜ and α ≥ 13 . Then γp ≤ γc if α > 13 .
(ii) Consider the equilibria in which L users stay in the Cooperative and H
users purchase from the TPP. Then γp ≥ γc for any α.
The result is interesting since it shows the effects of competition on the
level of investment. Consider first the equilibria in which H users stay in the
Cooperative and L users purchase from the TPP (part (i) in the proposition).
Intuitively, when α is small, H users enjoy smaller scale economies. Thus, for
L users, switching from the TPP to the cooperative is a less attractive option.
As a consequence, the TPP can increase s∗ and extract more rent. This has
a positive influence on the investment level of the TPP.
Consider now the equilibria in which L users stay in the Cooperative andH
users purchase from the TPP (point (ii) in the proposition). From Proposition
14 we know that this type of equilibrium exists either when α is large or when
the level of heterogeneity is large. In the first case, the cooperative looses
substantially in terms of scale economies with respect to the TPP. In the
second case the difference between the valuation is such that low users in the
cooperative agree on a very low investment. In both cases, the cooperative
invests less than the TPP.
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Note also that, as in the quasi-pooling equilibria, the simultaneous exis-
tence of two service providers have a negative impacts in terms of investment
level. Moreover, this reduction is not only due to the mere duplication of the
investments, but also to the strategic behavior of the private provider.
3.7 Conclusion
The correct functioning of financial markets relies more and more on the
existence of a number of infrastructures providing services that facilitates
transactions. Some of these infrastructures are user-owned. Others are third-
party owned. Interestingly, in many cases these infrastructures are competing
with each other. In this paper, we analyze the determinants of the quality
of the services provided. First, we investigate under which circumstances co-
existence of more than one provider is viable. Then we study how different
ownership regimes influence the strategic interaction between providers, and
evaluate the impact on the quality of the provision.
We prove that, despite the presence of network externalities (that would
favour monopolistic provision), there exist different types of equilibria in which
a cooperative and a private providers co-exist. Such co-existence equilibria
have negative implications in terms of reliability of service provision as they
always lead to an important loss of positive network externalities. However,
the performance in the different equilibria differs significantly and depends in
a crucial way on the decision rule used by the cooperative.
This last observation allows us to single out a preferential area for soft
intervention by a regulator. Through different forms of moral suasion, a reg-
ulator could, in fact, influence the whole market configuration by hampering
or fostering the presence of a second service provider. This is important since,
to the best of our knowledge, the current legislation does not allow any other
form of direct intervention. In this perspective, we believe that the main con-
tribution of our results is to highlight the consequences of some interesting
dynamics that are currently characterizing the market of financial services.
96
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 9 . Suppose the cooperative uses the median decision rule.
Note that the optimal investment decision, described in equation (3.1), is not influ-
enced by changes of hc and lc as long as the majority stays the same. The optimal
investment strategy of the TPP is described in equation (3.8). We can rewrite ICH
and ICL in the following way:
UHp (γp, s, λ) = U
H
c (γc, λ)⇒ (1− λ)s
∆i
c
(∆H − s∆i) = λ
c
(∆H∆i − ∆
2
i
2
) ICH
ULp (γp, s, λ) = U
L
c (γc, λ)⇒ (1− λ)s
∆i
c
(∆L − s∆i) = λ
c
(∆L∆i − ∆
2
i
2
) ICL
where ∆i = ∆H ,∆L, depending on whether hc > lc or vice versa. Solving ICH for
λ we get:
λ∗H =
2s∆¯(s∆¯−∆H)
∆¯2 + 2s2∆¯2 − 2∆i∆H − 2s∆¯∆H
Similarly, solving ICL for λ we get:
λ∗L =
2s∆¯(s∆¯−∆L)
∆¯2 + 2s2∆¯2 − 2∆i∆L − 2s∆¯∆L
In order to have an equilibrium we need λ∗H = λ
∗
L. This is true if and only if
s = ∆i2λ∗
H
:= s∗, with ∆i = ∆H ,∆L. By plugging this value in the definition of λ∗i
we get λ∗ = 1/3. To prove that this is an equilibrium note that: (i) no user has
incentive to deviate since both ICH and ICL are satisfied with strict equality; (ii)
for the same reason, s = ∆i2λ∗
H
maximizes TPP’s profit; (iii) the conditions above are
satisfied for any hc and lc such that hc + lc = 1/3 and such that the majority does
not change.
Finally, the optimal values of γc and γp are attained by substituting s
∗ and λ∗
in equations (3.1) and (3.8). That leads to γp(s
∗) = ∆(ω)3c , that is exactly the same
investment of the coexisting cooperative when λ = λ∗.
Proof of Proposition 10. The reduced profit of the Private Provider is attained
by substituting λ = 1/3, γp(s
∗) and s∗ in equation (3.7). We have
Π∗p(s
∗) =
∆2i
18c
with ∆i = ∆H if hc > lc and ∆i = ∆L otherwise. The profit is clearly positive.
Moreover it is bigger when hc > lc. That proves the result.
Proof of Proposition 11. Suppose the cooperative decides according to the av-
erage decision rule. Than every change in hc and hl influences the investment γc
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through the value of ∆¯c. The constraints ICH and ICL can be rewritten in the
following way:
(1− hc − lc)s∆¯
c
(∆H − s∆¯) = hc + lc
c
(∆H
hc∆H + lc∆L
hc + hl
− (
hc∆H+lc∆L
hc+hl
)2
2
) ICH
(1− hc − lc)s∆¯
c
(∆L − s∆¯) = hc + lc
c
(∆L
hc∆H + lc∆L
hc + hl
− (
hc∆H+lc∆L
hc+hl
)2
2
) ICL
We can solve simultaneously the equations above for hc and lc, and we get:
hc =
2s∆¯−∆L
3(∆H −∆L) ; lc =
∆H − 2s∆¯
3(∆H −∆L .
Thus, there exist a range of values of s for which you can find the correspondent
hc and lc in such a way to have ICH and ICL simultaneously satisfied. The TPP
chooses s = s∗ in such a way to maximize its profit. In order to calculate it, we have
to solve for s the following equation:
(1− λ)s∆¯
c
(∆H − s∆¯) = λ
c
(∆H∆¯c − ∆
2
i
2
)
that gives:
s∗(∆¯c) :=
∆¯∆H(1− λ) + k
2∆¯2(1− λ)
where k =
√
∆¯2(1− λ)(2∆¯2cλ− 4∆¯c∆Hλ+∆2H(1 − λ)). The TPP’s objective func-
tion can then be rewritten as:
Πp(s
∗, γ∗p) =
(1− λ)2s∗(∆¯c)2∆¯2
c
− c
2
(
(1− λ)s∗(∆¯c)∆¯
c
)2
that is strictly decreasing in ∆¯c. Since ∆¯c is increasing in hc, the TTP will set s
in such a way to minimize it. She can set it to zero. But in that case all H type
users will purchase the service from the TPP. Thus, this cannot be a quasi-pooling
equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 12. Suppose λ = 0. In this case the utility from being in
the cooperative is nil. If the Private Provider wants to serve both types of users, she
sets s as high as possible. The constraint is given by the L type users’ utility that, for
a given level of γ, is smaller that H users’ one. Thus, she chooses the s that makes
the L users’ utility equal to zero. As before, let p := s∆¯. Then p∗ is calculated as
follows:
ULp (γ, s) = 0 =⇒ (1− λ)s
∆¯
c
(∆L − s∆¯) = 0 =⇒ p∗ = ∆L
Thus, s∗ = ∆L
∆¯
. At this value, the L types are exactly indifferent between switching
and staying in the cooperative, whereas the H types enjoy a positive utility. Thus no
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one is willing to deviate.
The optimal investment level is given by γp(s
∗) = (1− λ) s∗∆¯
c
= ∆L
c
. This proves the
first claim.
Suppose now λ = 1. In this case the level of investment of the Private Provider
is equal to zero and, as a consequence, the users’ utility is also nil. Thus no user has
individual incentive to defect from the Cooperative, unless their utility from belonging
to it is negative. The condition for this not to happen is easily calculated from one
of the equations (3.2), (3.4) or (3.6) (depending on the cooperative’s decision rule):
ULc (γA) =
1
c
(∆L∆¯− ∆¯
2
2
) ≥ 0⇐⇒ ∆L ≥ (1− α)
(2− α)∆H
From equation (3.1), it is easy to see that when this condition is satisfied the invest-
ment is given by γA =
∆¯
c
.
If, instead, the Cooperative uses the median user decision rule (and hc ≥ 12 ), than
the condition we need is:
ULc (γc) =
1
c
(∆L∆H − ∆
2
H
2
) ≥ 0⇐⇒ ∆L ≥ ∆H
2
Finally, it is easy to see that when this condition is satisfied the investment is
given by γM =
∆H
c
.
Proof of Proposition 13. Suppose that all H users form a cooperative and that
all L users purchase from the TPP. Note that an L user enjoys the utility ULp =
s(1 − s)(1 − α)∆2L
c
by purchasing from the TPP; the TPP will set s such that an L
user is indifferent between purchasing from the TPP and switching to the coopera-
tive of H users. By deviating to a cooperative formed by H users only she would get
ULc =
α
c
(∆L∆H − ∆
2
H
2 ).
An H user belonging to a cooperative of users of the same type enjoys the utility
UHc =
α∆2H
2c .
• Suppose that ∆L ≤ ∆H2 . In this case an L user never wants to switch to the
cooperative. If he did, he would get a negative utility. That allows the TPP
to extract all the rent from the L users by setting s∗ = 1 (L users’ outside
option is negative) and γp = (1 − α)∆Lc (see equation (3.8)). We now have to
check that, given this behavior of the L types and of the TPP, H users do not
want to deviate. To see this, note that by deviating to the TPP serving only
L users, an H user would get UHp = (1 − α)∆Lc (∆H − ∆L) that is quadratic
in ∆L, first increasing and then decreasing. It intersect U
H
c =
α∆2H
2c twice in
the points ∆maxL =
[
1
2 +
√
1−4α+3α2
2(1−α)
]
∆H , ∆
min
L =
[
1
2 −
√
1−4α+3α2
2(1−α)
]
∆H . Note
that ∆maxL >
∆H
2 , hence for ∆L ≤ ∆H2 the only relevant threshold is ∆minL . We
can conclude that for ∆L ≤ ∆minL ≤ ∆H2 H users have no incentives to deviate
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and, hence, we have a subgame perfect equilibrium in which the cooperative
sets γc = α
∆H
c
.
• Suppose that ∆L ≥ ∆H2 . In this case, the TPP, in order to avoid deviation of
the L users, optimally sets s in such a way to satisfy the following equation:
s(1− s)(1 − α)∆
2
L
c
= ULc =
α
c
(∆L∆H − ∆
2
H
2
)
that implies s∗ = 12+
√
∆2
L
(1−α)+2∆2
H
α−4∆H∆Lα
2∆L
√
1−α . Note that the TPP maximizes
L users utility if s = 1/2. But if ∆L is large enough, L users might be willing
to switch even for s = 1/2. This threshold is calculated by solving for ∆L the
equation:
s∗ =
1
2
⇒
√
∆2L(1− α) + 2∆2Hα− 4∆H∆Lα
2∆L
√
1− α = 0
Solving this equation yields α1−α
(
2−√2
√
3− 1
α
)
∆H := ∆˜. So, whenever
∆L ≤ ∆˜L, there exist an s∗ such that L users do not deviate from the TPP.
Consider now the H users. An H user deviating to the TPP serving only L
users would get UHp = (1−α)s∗∆Lc (∆H − s∗∆L), where s∗ is defined as above.
Note that:
α∆2H
2c
≥ (1− α)s∗∆L
c
(∆H − s∗∆L) ∀α ≥ 1
3
Hence H users prefer to stay in the cooperative if α ≥ 13 . The threshold ∆˜
is well defined since it is equal to ∆H when α = 1/3 and converges to
∆H
2
as α goes to 1. Thus we have an equilibrium when ∆L ≤ ∆˜ and α ≥ 1/3 in
which the TPP optimally invests γp = (1−α)s∗∆Lc and the cooperative invests
γc = α
∆H
c
.
Proof of Proposition 14. Suppose that all L users form a cooperative and that
all H users purchase from the TPP. Note that an H user enjoys the utility UHp =
s(1 − s)α∆2H
c
purchasing from the TPP. By deviating to a cooperative formed by L
users only she would get UHc =
1−α
c
(∆L∆H − ∆
2
L
2 ).
An L user belonging to a cooperative of users of the same type enjoys the utility
ULc =
(1−α)∆2L
2c .
The TPP determines the optimal value for s by solving the following equation:
s(1− s)α∆
2
H
c
=
1− α
c
(∆L∆H − ∆
2
L
2
)
that implies that s∗ = 12 +
√
2∆2
L
(1−α)−4∆H∆L(1−α)+∆2Hα
2∆H
√
α
.
We first show that L users never want to deviate from the cooperative to the TPP,
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where they would enjoy the utility ULp = αs
∗∆H
c
(∆L − s∗∆H). We have different
cases to consider.
• Suppose first that s∗ ≥ ∆L∆H . In that case ULp is clearly negative. Since in
the cooperative they always enjoy positive utility, L users have no incentive to
deviate.
• Suppose now that s∗ ≤ ∆L∆H . This happens if and only if α ≤
2∆H−∆L
4∆H−3∆L . Under
these conditions, for the L types not to deviate, we need this condition to be
fulfilled:
ULc ≥ ULp ⇒
(1 − α)∆2L
2c
≥ αs∗∆H
c
(∆L − s∗∆H)
Note that ULp approaches U
L
c from below as ∆L → ∆H . Thus, there L users
have no incentives to deviate.
Consider now the H users. Note that when α ≥ 2/3, s∗ is always well defined and
lies in the interval [0.5, 1]. In fact, the term under the squared root (2∆2L(1 − α) −
4∆H∆L(1−α)+∆2Hα) is positive for any ∆L ≤ ∆H . Intuitively, since scale economies
are large, H users find it relatively unattractive to deviate to the cooperative. Thus
the TPP can always find an s above 1/2 such that H users do not want to deviate.
Given the observations above we have an equilibrium in which L users form a coop-
erative and that all H users purchase from the TPP
Suppose now α ≤ 2/3. In this case we need conditions on ∆L to ensure that s is
well defined. We need to find the value of ∆L such that, even when s
∗ reaches its
minimum (i.e. 12 ) H users prefer to stay in the cooperative. This is obtained by
solving for ∆L the following condition:√
2∆2L(1− α)− 4∆H∆L(1− α) + ∆2Hα
2∆H
√
α
= 0
⇒ ∆L =
(
1−
√
2
√
2− 5α+ 3α2
(2(1− α)
)
:= ∆ˆL
Since s∗ is decreasing in ∆L, when ∆L ≤ ∆ˆL we have an equilibrium in which L
users form a cooperative and that all H users purchase from the TPP.
In both scenarios, TPP optimally invests γp = αs
∗∆H
c
and the Cooperative sets
γc = (1− α)∆Lc , as described in Section 3.3 .
Proof of Proposition 15. In the coexistence equilibria, if hc > lc both infrastruc-
tures invest γp = γc =
∆H
3c := γ
∗. A monopolist private provider invests γp =
∆L
c
.
γ∗ > γp iff ∆L ≤ ∆H3 That proves the first point.
A monopolist cooperative invests γ = ∆i
c
whereas the investment in the coexisting
equilibria is γ∗ = ∆i3c , with i = H,L depending on whether hc > lc or vice versa.
That proves the second point.
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A monopolist private provider invests γ = ∆L3c , whereas the single cooperative invests
γ = ∆i
c
with i = H,L depending on whether α > 1/2. That proves the third point.
Proof of Proposition 16. (i) Consider first the case ∆L ≤ ∆minL ≤ ∆H2 . Then we
have:
γp < γc ⇒ (1− α)∆L
c
< α
∆H
c
⇒ 1− α
α
≤ ∆H
∆L
Consider now the case ∆H2 ≤ ∆L ≤ ∆˜ and α ≥ 13 . Then we have:
γp = α)s
∗∆H
c
=
(1− α)∆L +
√
1− α
√
2α∆H − 4α∆H∆L +∆2L − α∆2L)
2c
The cooperative sets instead γc = α
∆H
c
. γp is decreasing in α, whereas γc is increas-
ing. γp crosses γc from above when α = 1/3. That proves the result stated in part
(i) of the proposition.
(ii) In this case the TPP serving H users sets:
γp = α)s
∗∆H
c
= α
(
∆H +
√
∆2Hλ− 4(1− λ)∆H∆L + 2(1− λ)∆2L
2c
√
λ
)
This must be compared to γc = (1−α)∆Lc . By replacing the conditions for existence
of this type of equilibria into the formulas above, we can conclude that γc < γp for
any α in the relevant interval.
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